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NOTES
BANKRUPT ESTOPPEL: THE CASE FOR A
UNIFORM DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
AS APPLIED AGAINST FORMER
BANKRUPTCY DEBTORS
Eric Hilmo*
This Note examines the role judicial estoppel plays in supporting the U.S.
federal bankruptcy regime. Though once considered an obscure doctrine,
the use of judicial estoppel to bar pursuit of previously undisclosed claims
by former bankrupts has grown apace with burgeoning bankruptcy filings
over the last decade. While the doctrine’s application in federal courts has
evolved toward a common standard of application, state courts’ application
remains idiosyncratic. The Note argues that under the established laws of
judgment recognition and in light of federal courts’ sophisticated
application of the doctrine, state courts should apply federal judicial
estoppel standards to further national uniformity in bankruptcy practice.
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INTRODUCTION
An essential element of the American legal system is the expectation that
the execution of proceedings, suits, and actions in its courts are not founded
upon fraud. To fulfill this expectation, legislators and courts impose
requirements of honesty and good-faith when parties bring claims to the
courts for resolution.1 In addition to litigants’ statutory and pseudostatutory
obligations, the courts have additional “inherent powers” through which
judges ensure efficient, orderly, and fair disposition of cases.2 Among these
powers is a court’s ability to guard against litigant duplicity by employing
the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel.3
Briefly put, judicial estoppel permits a court to dismiss claims
inconsistent with a petitioning party’s representations in a prior legal
proceeding. Invoked to protect the integrity of the judicial system, judicial
estoppel has become an increasingly popular means of dismissing claims
brought by individuals who have previously filed for bankruptcy and failed
to disclose those claims as assets in the bankruptcy proceeding.4 There is
now a strong consensus among the federal circuits as to the standards to be
applied in such cases.5

1. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006) (criminalizing as perjury the willful misrepresentation
of one’s beliefs while under oath); FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (requiring counsel to certify, inter alia,
that their representations to the court are presented for a proper purpose, founded in existing
law, and supported by evidence).
2. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 58 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It
has long been understood that ‘[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts
of justice from the nature of their institution,’ powers ‘which cannot be dispensed with in a
Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.’” (quoting United States v.
Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812))).
3. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (“This rule, known as
judicial estoppel, generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an
argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.” (internal
quotation marks ommitted)).
4. See generally Eastman v. Union Pac. R.R., 493 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2007); Barger
v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003); Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291
F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002); Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761 (6th Cir. 2002); In re Coastal
Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 1999).
5. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
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Underpinning the courts’ common application of the doctrine are the
broadly recognized interests served by the United States’ uniform
Bankruptcy Code and the desire of the courts to ensure the integrity of their
processes.6 By contrast, state application of judicial estoppel postbankruptcy, though at times roughly following federal law, is subject to
varying standards which may lead to divergent results from those of the
federal courts.7 Consequently, there is mixed guidance for courts
considering application of judicial estoppel in new circumstances8 and a
growing need for a uniform doctrine to ensure the integrity of the
bankruptcy process.
In fact, the need for uniformity has never been greater. Over the past
decade, the frequency and complexity of federal bankruptcy petitions rose
significantly.9 Today, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis,
bankruptcy courts are beset by a record number of bankruptcy petitions10
and must increasingly deal with the repercussions of foreign bankruptcy
proceedings.11 In the years ahead, both federal and state courts will apply
judicial estoppel to decide whether to allow petitioners to pursue claims
they failed to disclose when seeking bankruptcy’s protections. To ensure
that these decisions adequately protect the integrity of the bankruptcy
process, the courts must apply a uniform standard of judicial estoppel.
This Note examines the doctrine of judicial estoppel in its narrow
application against former bankrupts in subsequent litigation. This Note
proceeds in four parts, first examining the purposes underlying the doctrine
of judicial estoppel and bankruptcy proceedings.12 It then looks specifically
at the federal courts’ evolving application of the doctrine13 and contrasts it
against state courts’ application.14 Next, it briefly discuss two key U.S.
Supreme Court cases that should provide insight for courts applying the

6. “The basic principle of [U.S.] bankruptcy is to obtain a discharge from one’s
creditors in return for all one’s assets, except those exempt, as a result of which creditors
release their own claims and the bankrupt can start fresh.” Payless Wholesale Distribs., Inc.
v. Alberto Culver (P.R.) Inc., 989 F.2d 570, 571 (1st Cir. 1993).
7. Compare Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 362
(3d Cir. 1996) (“[J]udicial estoppel would be inappropriate in any event as there is no
evidence that Ryan acted in bad faith.”), with Ruffin v. Kinder Morgan Liquids Terminal,
LLC, No. L-8976-04, 2009 WL 17887, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 2, 2009) (“[A]
finding of ‘bad faith’ is not a requirement under New Jersey law.” (quoting City of Atlantic
City v. Cal. Ave. Ventures, LLC, 23 N.J. Tax 62, 68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006))).
8. See generally Sea Trade Co. v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 03 Civ. 10254, 2008 WL
4129620 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2008) (applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel after extensive
and contested review of bankruptcy disclosure requirements under Argentine Bankruptcy
Law).
9. See infra notes 327–28 and accompanying text.
10. See id.
11. See infra notes 352–56 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part I.A–B.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.B.
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doctrine in the future.15 Finally, it makes recommendations for a uniform
application of the doctrine based largely on the current federal model.16
By examining both the theoretical principles underlying the doctrine of
judicial estoppel as well as its historic application by the courts, this Note
identifies the considerations that should guide courts considering the
application of judicial estoppel in the unique context of post-bankruptcy
litigation.17 Hopefully, future application of judicial estoppel will provide
greater protection to the interests of the judiciary in ensuring that judicial
estoppel is used appropriately, to protect the integrity of the judicial system
by denying former debtors the opportunity to play “fast and loose” with its
courts.
I. COMMON THEMES IN JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL & BANKRUPTCY
A. Judicial Estoppel
The equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel has long been applied by U.S.
courts seeking to prevent litigants from playing “fast and loose” in
litigation.18 Somewhat unique among the equitable estoppel doctrines, the
central purpose of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the legal
system itself.19 The basic formulation of the doctrine varies from one court
to another, though common tenets pervade.20 Among those elements of the
doctrine that courts commonly recognize is a refusal to apply the doctrine
against petitioners whose inconsistent positions stem from a good-faith
mistake.21 Generally, this exception ensures that judicial estoppel’s “harsh
results” reach only litigants truly seeking to hoodwink the judiciary.22

15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2001) (collecting circuit
decisions).
19. In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 205 (5th Cir. 1999) (characterizing judicial
estoppel as protecting “the judicial system, rather than the litigants”).
20. Compare id. at 206 (“Most courts have identified at least two limitations on the
application of the doctrine: (1) it may be applied only where the position of the party to be
estopped is clearly inconsistent with its previous one; and (2) that [the] party must have
convinced the court to accept that previous position.”), with Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. v.
Harvey, 260 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2001) (“First, it must be shown that the allegedly
inconsistent positions were made under oath in a prior proceeding. Second, such
inconsistencies must be shown to have been calculated to make a mockery of the judicial
system.”).
21. See, e.g., Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 362–
63 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 642 (7th Cir. 1990). But see Levin v.
Robinson, 586 A.2d 1348, 1358 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990) (“If courts were to entertain
such claims of ‘good faith mistake’ . . . the doctrine of judicial estoppel would be
emasculated or severely eroded, and, accordingly, its purpose subverted.”).
22. Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 1996) (identifying intent to mislead the
court as the determinative factor in applying judicial estoppel).
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1. Basic Concepts
Stated simply, the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars a litigant from
proceeding with a claim which is at odds with a position asserted by the
litigant in a prior legal proceeding.23 While jurists and scholars have
identified numerous objectives of the doctrine, at its core, the doctrine is
about guarding against litigant chicanery.24
The Supreme Court first articulated the doctrine’s general outlines in
1895 in Davis v. Wakelee.25 In Wakelee, the court barred a former debtor
from claiming that a judgment against him for a monetary debt by one of
his creditors was invalid on jurisdictional grounds.26 To secure a discharge
in his prior bankruptcy proceeding, however, the debtor had convinced the
bankruptcy court that the creditor’s judgment was valid.27 In reviewing the
case, the Wakelee court stated as a general proposition that:
[W]here a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and
succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply
because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially
if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position
formerly taken by him.28

Wakelee was the Supreme Court’s first formulation of this general rule,
though the practice of barring plaintiffs’ claims in equity due to prior
contrary positions in judicial proceedings was already well established in
federal and state courts.29 Full recognition of judicial estoppel in its present
form, however, would not occur until the twentieth century.30
23. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 749.
24. See id. at 750.
25. 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895). Commentators sometimes point to Hamilton v.
Zimmerman, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 39 (1857), as the original source of the term “judicial
estoppel” itself, if not the first articulation of the need for a doctrine to protect the integrity
of oaths taken in judicial proceedings. William Houston Brown, Lundy Carpenter & Donna
T. Snow, Debtor’s Counsel Beware: Use of the Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel in
Nonbankruptcy Forums, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 200 (2001).
26. Wakelee, 156 U.S. at 692.
27. Id. at 689.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Phila., Wilmington, & Balt. R.R. v. Howard, 54 U.S. 307, 308 (1851)
(estopping a railroad company from denying the authenticity of a sealed document which the
company had previously relied upon as authentic in prior litigation); Everett v. Saltus, 15
Wend. 474, 478 (N.Y. 1836) (holding that a party may not later assert a claim for value of a
lien against property as the property’s bailee, where the party initially claimed ownership of
the property as a bona fide purchaser).
30. State courts began the process of distinguishing “judicial estoppel” from certain
other estoppel doctrines prior to 1900. See Alexander v. Bourdier, 8 So. 876, 877 (La. 1891)
(“Judicial estoppel and estoppel in pais [are] different.”). Emlenton Ref. Co. v. Chambers, 35
F.2d 273 (3d Cir. 1929), appears to be the first federal articulation of the doctrine of “judicial
estoppel” as distinct from its sister doctrines of “equitable estoppel,” “collateral estoppel,” or
“res judicata.” See id. at 276. Prior to 1929, the various estoppel doctrines (including that of
res judicata) were inconsistently referred to by courts as “judicial estoppels.” See U.S. Fid.
& Guar. Co. v. Porter, 3 F.2d 57, 59 (D. Idaho 1924) (referring to “[a] third defense, that of
res adjudicata, or judicial estoppel.”). In fact, the term was often used to refer to any final
judgment by a judicial or even quasi-judicial body. See Clark v. Milens, 28 F.2d 457, 458
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Moreover, it was not until 2001 that the Supreme Court examined the
doctrine in detail in New Hampshire v. Maine.31 In New Hampshire, the
court applied judicial estoppel to prevent the state of New Hampshire from
asserting that its Piscataqua River boundary with Maine ran along the
Maine shore of the river, contrary to a 1970s consent judgment under which
New Hampshire had agreed the boundary ran along the geographic center
of the river.32 The court cited the Wakelee definition but elaborated on the
doctrine’s unique position as a protector of the judicial process.33 As the
Court noted, the doctrine is used to “prevent the perversion of the judicial
process”34 by “prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions
according to the exigencies of the moment.”35 Other courts have been more
colorful in describing the doctrine’s ultimate aims of promoting fair and
honest dealing in the courts.36 Yet, the central thrust of all these
formulations remains the same: the protection of the “integrity of the
judicial process.”37
2. Distinguishing Characteristics
Because judicial estoppel protects against the “improper use of judicial
machinery,”38 the doctrine is distinguishable from its sister doctrines of
collateral and equitable estoppel.39 For one, the doctrine of judicial
estoppel has broader preclusive effects than that of collateral estoppel,
which has been described as a doctrine of “issue preclusion.”40 Though
(9th Cir. 1928) (holding that because the judgment of a bankruptcy referee is binding upon
the parties to the bankruptcy, “[i]t constitutes a judicial estoppel.”).
31. 532 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2001) (noting that the Court has “not had occasion to discuss
the doctrine elaborately.”).
32. Id. at 749.
33. See id. at 749–50.
34. Id. at 750 (quoting In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1990).
35. Id. (quoting United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 1993).
36. See Reynolds v. Comm’r, 861 F.2d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing the various
metaphors courts have used to describe the evils judicial estoppel guards against, including:
“playing fast and loose with the courts,” Scarano v. Central R.R., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir.
1953); “blowing hot and cold as the occasion demands,” Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d
1162, 1167 n.3 (4th Cir. 1982); and “hav[ing] [one’s] cake and eat[ing] it too,” Duplan Corp.
v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1177 (D.S.C. 1974)).
37. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 749–51 (citing various cases to illustrate the uniform
agreement among the courts as to the purpose of judicial estoppel).
38. Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
39. See generally Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355,
360 (3d Cir. 1996) (distinguishing judicial estoppel from equitable estoppel); Eugene R.
Anderson & Nadia V. Holober, Preventing Inconsistencies in Litigation with a Spotlight on
Insurance Coverage Litigation: The Doctrines of Judicial Estoppel, Equitable Estoppel,
Quasi-Estoppel, Collateral Estoppel, “Mend the Hold,” “Fraud on the Court” and Judicial
and Evidentiary Admissions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 589, 589–753 (1998) (outlining the general
differences in the various preclusive doctrines).
40. See Anderson & Holober, supra note 39, at 669 (“The doctrine provides that when
an issue of fact or law has been litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and
the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a
subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 749.
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application of judicial estoppel will often stem from a party’s advancement
of a singular fact or legal argument, the preclusive effect of that
representation is to bar not only an inconsistent position with respect to that
issue, but also all successive “claims” inconsistent with that
representation.41 And, unlike “equitable estoppel,” which requires the party
asserting the doctrine to prove that it relied on the prior representation to its
detriment, a party asserting judicial estoppel need not prove its reliance on
its opponent’s inconsistent position.42
Among the various preclusive doctrines, that of res judicata is most
similar to judicial estoppel, though there are important distinctions.43
Unlike res judicata, judicial estoppel does not require a “final judgment” in
a prior proceeding to be invoked.44 Likewise, the doctrine is often invoked
where the estopped party’s prior inconsistent position was advanced in a
nonjudicial proceeding.45 Judicial estoppel may bar subsequent litigation
even where the preceding legal action was unrelated to the present case.46
Another interesting distinction between collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel is its
potential use in an offensive context. Since judicial estoppel is not dependent upon the
litigation process to establish a fact, but upon parties’ intentional representations before the
court, it theoretically would be permissible to allow plaintiffs not party to the prior litigation
to assert the doctrine in an offensive manner. Cf. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (“The general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff could easily
have joined in the earlier action or where, either for the reasons discussed above or for other
reasons, the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge
should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel.”).
41. See generally White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., 617 F.3d 472 (6th Cir.
2010) (applying judicial estoppel to bar continued pursuit of plaintiff’s sexual harassment
claims).
42. See Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 223 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996).
43. To reduce confusion, this paper distinguishes the doctrine of res judicata from that of
collateral estoppel, though this distinction is somewhat misleading since many authors
characterize collateral estoppel as a category within the broader doctrine of res judicata. See
18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (2d ed.
2011). Procedurally, judicial estoppel appears to be treated similarly to questions of res
judicata since it may be raised by defendants in a motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment. See Dunellen, LLC v. Getty Props. Corp., 567 F.3d 35, 37–38 (1st Cir. 2009)
(upholding trial court’s application of res judicata and judicial estoppel in granting summary
judgment). Also similar to res judicata, the doctrine can be raised sua sponte by the court
itself. In re M Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co.,
667 F.2d 1162, 1168 n.5 (4th Cir. 1982)) (doctrine may be raised by court on appeal sua
sponte).
44. See White, 617 F.3d at 478–79 (applying judicial estoppel where the court adopted
prior position as a “preliminary matter”).
45. Smith v. Pinner, 891 F.2d 784, 787 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying judicial estoppel to
bar contradiction of a stipulation made in a workers’ compensation proceeding); Smith v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 388 F.2d 291, 292 (6th Cir. 1968) (barring the contradiction of
statements made in a prior workers’ compensation proceeding).
46. Compare Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979) (“Under res judicata, ‘a final
judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause
of action.’” (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)) (emphasis added)),
with Schomaker v. United States, 334 F. App’x 336, 339–40 (1st Cir. 2009) (applying
judicial estoppel to bar plaintiff from asserting a tort law claim of wrongful retention of
property against the United States, where the value of the property was significantly
underreported in plaintiff’s prior no-asset bankruptcy proceedings). Indeed, some have
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Thus, unlike res judicata, nonparties with no expressed interest in the prior
litigation may invoke judicial estoppel in the second proceeding.47
Given the underlying purpose of judicial estoppel, it is no surprise that
among the various formulations of the judicial estoppel rule, the virtually
universal first element is that the party to be estopped must be asserting a
position “irreconcilably inconsistent” with one previously advanced.48
Estoppel is therefore not appropriate where there is only an appearance of
inconsistency but where the two positions may be reconciled,49 for example
due to differing legal definitions of the same terms in different
jurisdictions.50 In some contexts application of this requirement is
straightforward, yet courts have grappled with this requirement in the face
of modern pleading rules which allow parties to plead in the alternative.51
Some courts have accommodated modern pleading practices by requiring
that a prior inconsistent position be one based on fact rather than an
argument of law before applying judicial estoppel.52 Other courts decline

argued that judicial estoppel acts to “fill in the gaps” left by res judicata. See 18 WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 43, at § 4403 (“[M]ore recent decisions have resurrected the “judicial
estoppel” label and seem to be expanding preclusion under this label to pick up some points
that res judicata theory does not reach.”).
47. Compare Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154–55 (1979) (finding that res
judicata presupposes identical claims and that the claims of nonparties brought in subsequent
litigation differ by definition from those in the original litigation), with Sea Trade Co. v.
FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 03 Civ. 10254, 2008 WL 4129620, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4,
2004) (holding that the asserting party was not a party to the plaintiff’s prior bankruptcy
proceeding, but still permitted to assert judicial estoppel in subsequent litigation), aff’d sub
nom. Adrogué Chico S.A. v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 427 F. App’x 43 (2d Cir. 2011).
48. Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 239 (3d Cir. 2011)
(quoting G–I Holdings, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 247, 262 (3d Cir. 2009)); see also
Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 775 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[J]udicial estoppel bars a party from
(1) asserting a position that is contrary to one that the party has asserted under oath in a prior
proceeding. . . .”); United States v. Hook, 195 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 1999); In re Coastal
Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 206 (5th Cir. 1999); Hossaini v. W. Mo. Med. Ctr., 140 F.3d
1140, 1143 (8th Cir. 1998); Maharaj v. BankAmerica Corp., 128 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1997).
49. See In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 642 (7th Cir. 1990).
50. For example in Linnehan Leasing v. State Tax Assessor, 898 A.2d 408 (Me. 2006),
the Maine Supreme Court declined to apply judicial estoppel to bar the state from taxing two
corporate entities separately even though the state had previously argued the two
corporations were a “single unit” in a prior unfair trade practices action. Id. at 414–15. The
court found that because the state’s prior position was not asserted in reliance on an
interpretation of the tax code, which the subsequent suit required, the judicial estoppel
argument failed. Id.
51. See Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1982) (“[Judicial
estoppel] obviously contemplates something other than the permissible practice, now freely
allowed, of simultaneously advancing in the same action inconsistent claims or defenses
which can then, under appropriate judicial control, be evaluated as such by the same tribunal,
thus allowing an internally consistent final decision to be reached.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P.
8(e)(2))). The court in Allen went on to apply the doctrine to prevent the plaintiff from
recovering in a personal injury suit in which the plaintiff asserted an employee-employer
relationship at odds with that asserted in one prior judicial proceeding and two prior
administrative proceedings. See generally id.
52. See Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he position sought to
be estopped must be one of fact rather than law or legal theory.”).
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to limit the doctrine to factual inconsistencies alone.53 Such distinctions
between inconsistency in law or fact, however, may be irrelevant when
viewed in light of the doctrine’s secondary elements which better define
judicial estoppel’s application.54
Beyond the inconsistent position itself, jurists and scholars often identify
two secondary elements that courts examine before invoking judicial
estoppel: (1) whether the tribunal in the prior proceeding relied upon the
representation in reaching some conclusion; and (2) whether the
inconsistency is evidence of bad faith undermining a litigant’s obligation to
be honest in his representations.55 These observers in turn classify courts as
embracing either a “judicial acceptance” or “sanctity of the oath” version of
judicial estoppel.56
Where courts adopt the “judicial acceptance” standard, they look to
whether allowing a case to proceed would give the appearance that the
judiciary was misled in the prior action.57 The “judicial acceptance”
analysis entails determining whether the duplicitous party derived a benefit
or obtained an advantage as a result of the inconsistent positions.58 As
noted above, the opposing party’s reliance on the prior inconsistent position
is not required, but where accepting an inconsistent position will convey an
unfair advantage to the party asserting the inconsistent position, courts may
apply judicial estoppel.59
It should be noted however, that neither an unfair advantage, nor a
material benefit to the inconsistent party is necessary to find the “judicial
acceptance” required to judicially estop a litigant.60 All that need be shown
is that the prior tribunal or agency relied upon the representation in reaching
some decision.61 Courts applying judicial estoppel thus review the
53. Cassidy, 892 F.2d at 642 (“[I]n this case we think that the change of position on the
legal question is every bit as harmful to the administration of justice as a change on an issue
of fact.”).
54. In re Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d 197, 208, 210 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting another circuit’s
requirement of inconsistency in factual representations but expressing no opinion on the
requirement and applying judicial estoppel due to prior judicial acceptance of bankruptcy
filings valuing estate assets at less than $20,000).
55. See Anderson & Holober, supra note 39, at 624–32 (contrasting the “sanctity of the
oath” and the “judicial acceptance” approaches in the application of judicial estoppel).
56. Id.
57. “[A]bsent judicial acceptance . . . the judicial process is unaffected and the
perception and/or danger that either the first or subsequent court was misled is not present.”
Stevens Technical Servs., Inc. v. S.S. Brooklyn, 885 F.2d 584, 588–89 (9th Cir. 1989).
58. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001).
59. See Scarano v. Cent. R. Co. of N.J., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953).
60. See In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 640–41 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying judicial estoppel
to bar litigant’s appeal from a prior adverse judgment); see also Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667
F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1982) (“Though perhaps not necessarily confined to situations
where the party asserting the earlier contrary position there prevailed, it is obviously more
appropriate in that situation.”).
61. Lewandowski v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 882 F.2d 815, 819–20 (3d
Cir. 1989) (noting that while a prior favorable jury verdict did not necessarily mean the jury
found the individual permanently disabled, the party was judicially estopped from seeking to
reclaim his job from his employer four days after the verdict because if the individual’s
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opinions, verdicts, or orders of the prior proceedings and determine whether
the court expressly or implicitly relied on the representation.62
Consequently, judicial estoppel may be applied in cases where a litigant did
not ultimately prevail on his case in chief, but convinced a tribunal to rely
on his representation to reach some conclusion in a prior case.63 Where it
cannot be determined if the court relied on the representation, for example
where a case settles before any court order is issued, judicial estoppel is not
applied.64
Where the inconsistency in positions is so egregious as to manifest bad
faith by the party in fulfilling its obligations of fair dealing and honesty to
the court, courts may apply judicial estoppel even where there was no
reliance by the court in the prior proceeding.65 Courts adopting this
standard are often characterized as seeking to preserve the “sanctity of the
oath.”66 Konstantinidis v. Chen67 sets forth the most commonly cited
justification for this policy: “[T]o the extent that prior sworn statements are
involved, the doctrine upholds the ‘public policy which exalts the sanctity
of the oath.’”68 In these courts, the general inquiry is whether the litigant
was under a duty as the result of an oath or other obligation, to make an
honest representation in the prior proceeding.69 Application of judicial
estoppel in such circumstances guards against “reckless and false
swearing,” thereby preserving the public’s confidence in the judiciary.70
A common requirement under either the judicial acceptance or sanctity of
the oath version of judicial estoppel is actual intent to mislead the court.71
As the Supreme Court noted in New Hampshire, the doctrine “‘prohibit[s]
parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of
the moment.’”72 Such bad faith may be discerned from the record where

employability had been made known to the jury, the prior verdict would likely have been
affected).
62. Id.
63. Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 899–900 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that
appellant’s success in petitioning British appellate courts was sufficient to estop later cause
of action even though his appeals ultimately failed).
64. See In re Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 356 B.R. 93, 106–07 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(discussing when prior settlements provide sufficient evidence of judicial acceptance to
support an application of judicial estoppel).
65. See In re Corey, 892 F.2d 829, 835–36 (9th Cir. 1989); Anderson & Holober, supra
note 39, at 624.
66. Anderson & Holober, supra note 39, at 624.
67. 626 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
68. See id. at 937 (quoting Melton v. Anderson, 222 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1948)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 939–40 (declining to apply judicial estoppel where litigant’s prior
inconsistent position was based on a medical diagnosis he reasonably believed).
72. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2001) (emphasis added) (quoting
United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 1993)).
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the inconsistency constitutes a particularly egregious affront to judicial
dignity.73
Concomitant with the requirement of bad faith is the widespread practice
of declining to apply judicial estoppel where an inconsistency is the result
of a “good-faith mistake” on the part of the litigant.74 While courts vary as
to when mistakes are made in good faith,75 in the context of judicial
estoppel, only true inadvertence or a seemingly obvious mistake with
respect to a given factual condition will ordinarily prevent application of the
doctrine.76 Where a litigant is merely unsure of the law and his legal
obligations, the courts often do not find that the mistaken belief or action is
in good faith.77 This is true even when the litigant relied on the advice of
an attorney in pursuing a given course of action.78 Instead, courts treat
malpractice as the appropriate remedy for defective legal advice.79
As with any equitable doctrine, courts’ independent evaluation of each
case’s specific factors make generalizations about the doctrine’s application
difficult.80 Consequently, courts have resisted articulating universal criteria
for the doctrine’s application in all litigious proceedings.81 Where the
litigation in which judicial estoppel is invoked touches on prior legal
proceedings with common themes and procedures, however, application of
the doctrine often results in similar results despite varying legal standards.82
73. See Klein v. Stahl GMBH & Co. Maschinefabrik, 185 F.3d 98, 111 n.13 (3d Cir.
1999).
74. See Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1997); Ryan Operations
G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 362 (3d Cir. 1996); John S. Clark Co. v.
Faggert & Frieden, P.C., 65 F.3d 26, 29 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Konstantinidis, 626 F.2d at
939–40 (refusing to apply judicial estoppel where litigant’s inconsistency is due to
unintentional error).
75. Allowance for a good faith mistake is common to many bodies of law and, as with
judicial estoppel, the definitions vary widely. See, e.g., United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475,
487 (1967) (refusing to find a violation of law where the defendant relied in good faith upon
vague and undefined laws before traveling to a restricted country); Pac. Fisheries Corp. v.
HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins., Ltd., 239 F.3d 1000, 1002–03 (9th Cir. 2001) (denying an untimely
request for a jury in a criminal trial where the late request was due to an attorney’s incorrect
understanding of a law).
76. See In re Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d 197, 210–11 (5th Cir. 1999).
77. See White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., 617 F.3d 472, 483–84 (6th Cir.
2010).
78. See id.; A & J Constr. Co. v. Wood, 116 P.3d 12, 17–18 (Idaho 2005). Courts
sometimes apply a narrow exception to this general rule where, despite finding a litigant’s
prior inconsistent position at odds with their legal obligations, courts recognize that the law
is genuinely unsettled (for instance where there are conflicting judicial rulings on the
matter). See Woodard v. Taco Bueno Rests. Inc., No. 4:05-CV-804-Y, 2006 WL 3542693, at
*11 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2006).
79. See Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633–34 (1962)).
80. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2001).
81. Id. at 750 (“[T]he circumstances under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be
invoked are probably not reducible to any general formulation of principle.” (quoting Allen
v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Hughes v. Mitchell Co., 49 So.3d 192, 203 (Ala. 2010); A & J Constr. Co., 116 P.3d at 17.
82. See Benjamin J. Vernia, Judicial Estoppel of Subsequent Action Based on
Statements, Positions, or Omissions As To Claim or Interest in Bankruptcy Proceeding, 85
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Not surprisingly, post-bankruptcy litigation has proven fertile ground for
application of the doctrine given the scope, procedural and statutory
uniformity, and commonly recognized interests in federal bankruptcy.83
B. Federal Bankruptcy
The nature of federal bankruptcy—its scheme and motivations—lends
itself to the application of judicial estoppel as a safeguard of the integrity of
the bankruptcy process. In its current form,84 U.S. bankruptcy law is
comprised of a uniform federal Bankruptcy Code85 that allows for state to
state variation to protect certain property rights.86 The power to establish
uniform laws for the administration of bankruptcy proceedings is expressly
reserved to Congress in the U.S. Constitution.87 Title 11 of the U.S. Code
creates standard types (chapters) of bankruptcy proceedings applicable in
every federal jurisdiction.88 To preserve the integrity of the bankruptcy
process, the Bankruptcy Code imposes strict requirements of disclosure and
honest dealing upon debtors seeking bankruptcy’s numerous protections.89
As interpreted by the courts, these obligations reflect Congress’s interest in
protecting both the parties whose legal rights are affected by the bankruptcy
process and the integrity of the bankruptcy process itself.90 As employed in
post-bankruptcy litigation, judicial estoppel reinforces and backstops these

A.L.R.5TH 353 (2011) (cataloguing state and federal cases in which the facts led the court to
apply judicial estoppel in post-bankruptcy litigation).
83. Practitioners’ publications examining judicial estoppel in the post-bankruptcy
context often highlight the growing application of judicial estoppel in courts of various
jurisdictions. See generally, e.g., Tanya N. Lewis, Bankruptcy Filings and Civil Litigation—
Judicial Estoppel in Action, UTAH BAR J., Nov.–Dec. 2011, at 34–37; Seymour Roberts, Jr.,
Preserving Claims for Postconfirmation Litigation, NORTON ANN. SURV. BANKR. L., Sept.
2007; Craig A. Roeb, Disclose or Dismiss: Part of Any Litigator’s Due Diligence Should Be
To Determine If the Plaintiff Has a Pending Bankruptcy Action, L.A. LAW., Nov. 2008, at
25–31.
84. The early history of bankruptcy law in the United States was characterized by fits
and starts in which Congress enacted and subsequently repealed various bankruptcy
legislation. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge,
65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 344–69 (1991) (chronicling U.S. bankruptcy law throughout the
1800s and describing the evolving effects of bankruptcy discharge during the nineteenth
century). Consequently, for long periods of the United States’ first century, bankruptcy law
was wholly shaped by state bankruptcy practice. See id.
85. See generally 11 U.S.C. (2006).
86. See id. § 522 (deferring to state laws governing the exemption of property).
87. “The Congress shall have Power to . . . establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
88. See id. §§ 701–784 (Chapter 7—Liquidation); id. §§ 901–946 (Chapter 9—
Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality); id. §§ 1101–1174 (Chapter 11—Reorganization);
id. §§ 1201–1231 (Chapter 12—Adjustment of debts of a family farmer or fisherman with
regular annual income); id. §§ 1301–1330 (Chapter 13—Adjustment of debts of an
individual with regular income); id. §§ 1501–1532 (Chapter 15—Ancillary and other crossborder cases).
89. See id. § 521.
90. Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 1988).
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interests by eliminating opportunities for debtors to profit from bad-faith
conduct when seeking bankruptcy’s protections.91
1. National Uniformity
At its core, federal bankruptcy law provides a nationally uniform means
of resolving debtor insolvency via the preemption of state debt collection
laws.92 Though bankruptcy proceedings are the exclusive jurisdiction of
federal courts, state law plays a significant role in its application.93When a
debtor or creditor successfully petitions a bankruptcy court,94 the immediate
effect of the petition is to vest all of the debtor’s property interests in a
bankruptcy estate.95 The federal bankruptcy court will then distribute the
estate in an orderly manner to the debtor’s creditors in accordance with the
applicable bankruptcy chapter under which the petition was filed.96 Though
the power to distribute the estate is solely that of the federal bankruptcy
court, the process of distribution, in particular the assets which may not be
distributed to creditors are shaped by state law.97 In the strictest sense, U.S.
bankruptcy practice, thus, varies in each state.98 Viewed as a whole,
however, the Code is better characterized as embodying Congress’s desire
to create a nationally uniform means of addressing debtor insolvency, while
acknowledging states’ important interests in regulating the property rights
of their citizens.99
Title 11 contains the federal statutes governing the bankruptcy and
insolvency process that are employed by the federal bankruptcy courts of
the United States.100 Under Title 11, debtors may pursue any of six
different means of distributing the bankruptcy estate, each different avenue
generally referred to by its corresponding statutory chapter.101 Among
91. See id. at 419–20.
92. See NATHALIE MARTIN & OCEAN TAMA, INSIDE BANKRUPTCY LAW: WHAT MATTERS
AND WHY 31–32 (2011).
93. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (deferring to state laws governing the exemption of property).
94. See id. §§ 301, 302, 303 (establishing grounds for the commencement of voluntary,
joint, and involuntary bankruptcy proceedings, respectively).
95. See id. § 541.
96. See, e.g., id. §§ 726, 1142.
97. Federal courts apply these “homestead” provisions, so named due to their frequent
protection of debtor’s primary domiciles, under § 522.
98. In addition to state “homestead” statutes, the federal bankruptcy courts of each
district are permitted to enact their own rules of procedure. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9029.
99. MARTIN & TAMA, supra note 92, at 30.
100. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532. These federal bankruptcy courts lack full
adjudicatory powers under Article III of the Constitution. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct.
2594, 2608–09 (2011). Instead, their powers stem from Congress’s delegation of bankruptcy
authority to federal district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 157, and the district courts may in turn
refer the bankruptcy proceedings to bankruptcy judges. Because they are not full Article III
courts, however, bankruptcy courts’ powers are limited to the adjudication of matters
directly related to the bankruptcy proceeding. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608–11.
101. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–784 (Chapter 7—Liquidation); id. §§ 901–946
(Chapter 9—Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality); id. §§ 1101–1174 (Chapter 11—
Reorganization); id. §§ 1201–1231 (Chapter 12—Adjustment of debts of a family farmer or
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these, Chapter 7, Chapter 11, and Chapter 13 proceedings are the most
common.102
Each of these three more popular chapters employs a different process to
aid debtors and creditors in restoring debtor solvency or providing the
debtor with a fresh start.103 Under Chapter 7, the bankruptcy estate of a
debtor is liquidated by a court appointed bankruptcy trustee.104 The
proceeds from the liquidation are used to settle all claims by creditors,105
paying each based on rank preference as established by the Code.106 Upon
liquidation of the debtor’s estate, the court will grant a discharge which
effectively resolves all debts that existed prior to the bankruptcy petition,107
provided that the debtor has complied with his obligations to the bankruptcy
court in good faith.108 This process of liquidation differs significantly from
those of Chapter 11 or 13 which are employed to “reorganize” and repay
debtors’ obligations to designated classes of creditors.109
Under both Chapters 11 and 13, the bankruptcy estate is administered via
a reorganization plan that is negotiated with the debtor’s creditors and
implemented with court supervision over a period of time.110 Aside from
the parties that typically file under each chapter,111 the two chapters differ
principally in the process employed by the bankruptcy court to draft and
implement the plan.112 Under Chapter 11, a debtor assumes the role of
“debtor-in-possession,” incurring a fiduciary duty as a trustee to act on
behalf of the bankruptcy estate to develop and implement a reorganization
plan under the supervision of a court-appointed bankruptcy
administrator.113 Under Chapter 13, the court appoints a bankruptcy trustee

fisherman with regular annual income); id. §§ 1301–1330 (Chapter 13—Adjustment of debts
of an individual with regular income); id. §§ 1501–1532 (Chapter 15—Ancillary and other
cross-border cases).
102. See
Bankruptcy,
U.S.COURTS.GOV,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/
Bankruptcy.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
103. Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–784 (Chapter 7—Liquidation) with id. §§ 1101–1174
(Chapter 11—Reorganization), and id. §§ 1301–1330 (Chapter 13—Adjustment of debts of
an individual with regular income).
104. See Chapter 7, Bankruptcy Basics, U.S.COURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/
FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter7.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
105. See id.
106. See 11 U.S.C. § 726.
107. See id. § 727(b).
108. See generally id. § 727(a) (identifying the grounds for a denial of a Chapter 7
discharge).
109. Compare id. § 726, with id. §§ 1123, 1322.
110. See id. §§ 1101–1146, 1301–1330.
111. Though individuals may file under Chapter 11, the reorganization process under
Chapter 11 is typically more amenable to corporate entities seeking to manage their debts
while maintaining operations. See id. § 109(d); Process, U.S.COURTS.GOV,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Process.aspx
(last
visited Nov. 16, 2012). Individual debtors seeking a reorganization plan are more likely to
file under Chapter 13 where possible. See id.
112. Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1130, with id. §§ 1301–1330.
113. See id. § 1107.
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to develop and implement the reorganization plan.114 Under both chapters,
the reorganization plan is ultimately confirmed by the court115 with input
from creditors116 and may involve the reduction of the debtor’s total
financial obligations.117
2. Duties of Debtors
Despite the differences, there are numerous procedural commonalities
among all of the various bankruptcy chapters.118 As a rule, all debtors have
the right to file voluntarily for bankruptcy.119 Section 109, however,
specifies which chapter debtors may file under, limiting petitioning
corporations to Chapter 11 but allowing individual filers to file under any of
the three chapters.120 Individual debtors are also subject to additional
restrictions which allow for the dismissal or conversion of Chapters 7 and
13 petitions where the debtor’s income or debt fails to meet statutorily
established levels,121 or the nature of his debts precludes filing under
Chapter 7.122 Regardless of the chapter chosen, upon filing, all debtors are
subject to the same general duties to inform the bankruptcy court of their
financial affairs such that the court may accurately value the bankruptcy
estate and efficiently conduct the bankruptcy proceedings.123 Thus, chief
among any petitioner’s obligations is his duty to disclose any and all assets
he may possess at the time of the petition.124
114. See id. § 1302.
115. See id. §§ 1129, 1325.
116. The level of creditor involvement in the development of the reorganization plan
varies significantly under the two Chapters. Creditors to Chapter 11 debtors vote on the
terms of the reorganization plan and may propose their own plans for approval by other
creditors. See id. § 1121(c). Chapter 13 plans, by contrast, involve less creditor involvement
since the terms of payment are generally limited by the debtor’s monthly disposable income,
which serves as a cap on monthly payments. See id. §§ 1324–1325.
117. See id. § 1123(a)(3) (requiring a reorganization plan to specify how “impaired
claims,” those that will not be fully repaid under the plan, will be treated); id. § 1322(a)(4)
(allowing for less than full payment of secured claims where the reorganization plan ensures
all of the debtor’s disposable income will otherwise be used toward payment of like claims
during the implementation of the plan).
118. See generally id. §§ 101–561.
119. See id. § 301. Only Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases may be initiated
involuntarily. Id. § 303. Placing a debtor under Chapter 13 involuntarily would effectively
constitute a form of indentured servitude. See generally 11 U.S.C.A. § 303 (2010) (historical
and statutory notes).
120. See generally id. § 109. Section 109 also specifies the conditions under which
individuals or business entities may file under any of the other “special” chapters. Id.
121. See id. § 707(b)(2)(A) (allowing dismissal of a case filed under Chapter 7 where
maintenance of the case would constitute an abuse of the chapter’s provisions given a
debtor’s monthly income). In contrast to the maximum income level limitations imposed on
Chapter 7 petitioners, individuals seeking Chapter 13 protection have statutory debt
maximums above which they are ineligible to pursue Chapter 13 reorganization. See id.
§ 109(e).
122. See id. § 707(b)(1) (allowing for dismissal or conversion of a Chapter 7 case to a
Chapter 11 or 13 case where the Chapter 7 petitioner’s debts are primarily consumer debts).
123. See generally id. § 521.
124. See id.
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The duty to disclose does not end at the moment of filing, however, and a
debtor seeking bankruptcy protection is said to face substantial and ongoing
asset disclosure obligations.125 The assets a debtor must disclose when
seeking bankruptcy are not defined explicitly or itemized in the relevant
statute, 11 U.S.C. § 521.126 Instead, courts have characterized the
requirements in § 521 as comprising a “non-exhaustive list.”127 In effect, a
debtor is required to divulge every conceivable asset, including real and
personal property, financial holdings, and any claims the debtor holds to
property not in his immediate possession.128 These claims include the
debtor’s legal interest in any future civil suits based upon an already
accrued cause of action, though highly speculative claims are exempt.129
Procedurally, the debtor’s first opportunity to divulge his assets and any
prospective claims or causes of action arises under his “duty to file . . . a
schedule of assets and liabilities . . . [and] a statement of the debtor’s
financial affairs.”130 In addition to this initial notification, Chapter 11
125. See generally id. § 521(f); White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., 617 F.3d
472, 479 n.5 (6th Cir. 2010) (permitting the court to require disclosure of a debtor’s federal
tax returns while the bankruptcy case is still in effect).
126. Under 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1), a debtor must file
(A) a list of creditors; and
(B) unless the court orders otherwise—
(i) a schedule of assets and liabilities;
(ii) a schedule of current income and current expenditures;
(iii) a statement of the debtor’s financial affairs . . . .
127. See Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 417 (3d Cir.
1988).
128. See id. at 417.
129. See Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d
314, 323 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Although we do not require debtors to list hypothetical claims that
are so tenuous as to be fanciful, we do require them to advise creditors . . . [where they have]
‘enough information . . . prior to confirmation to suggest that [they] may have a possible
cause of action[] . . . .’” (quoting In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 208 (5th Cir.
1999))).
130. See 11 U.S.C. § 521. The requirement to divulge ongoing or prospective civil claims
has in fact been incorporated into the official filing forms. See B-6B (Official Form 6B),
Schedule B Personal Property, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_1207/B_006B_1207f.pdf (“Except as directed below,
list all personal property of the debtor of whatever kind.”). The column “Type of Property”
includes, inter alia:
17. Alimony, maintenance, support, and property settlements to which the debtor
is or may be entitled. Give particulars.
18. Other liquidated debts owed to debtor including tax refunds. Give particulars.
19. Equitable or future interests, life estates, and rights or powers exercisable for
the benefit of the debtor other than those listed in Schedule A—Real Property.
20. Contingent and noncontingent interests in estate of a decedent, death benefit
plan, life insurance policy, or trust.
21. Other contingent and unliquidated claims of every nature, including tax
refunds, counterclaims of the debtor, and rights to setoff claims. Give estimated
value of each.
Id.; see also B-7 (Official Form 7), Statement of Financial Affairs, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_Official_2010/B_007
_0410.pdf. Under Requirement 4, “Suits and administrative proceedings, executions,
garnishments and attachments,” the following information must be disclosed: “[A]ll suits
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petitioners must also file an additional disclosure statement along with their
plan of reorganization.131 This disclosure statement must contain “adequate
information,” or “information . . . in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably
practicable . . . that would enable . . . a hypothetical investor . . . to make an
informed judgment about the plan[] . . . .”132 The Chapter 11 debtor’s duty
is a “continuing one,”133 the fulfillment of which courts have found to be
part-and-parcel of a Chapter 11 petitioner’s right to be heard during
reorganization proceedings.134 Though Chapters 7 and 13 do not expressly
require debtors to file separate disclosure statements, Chapters 7 and
Chapter 13 filings permit later amendment, thus implying a similar
continuing duty of disclosure upon petitioners under those chapters.135
3. Future Claims
Ultimately, all future causes of action will be included in the assets of the
bankruptcy estate, defined by 11 U.S.C. § 541 as “all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor.”136 The court, trustee, and creditors will then use the
information disclosed to determine the proper way to liquidate the estate or
in their consideration of whether to confirm and execute the bankruptcy
plan.137
Given the all-encompassing nature of the bankruptcy estate under § 541,
a discharge from bankruptcy where a debtor failed to disclose certain assets
places those assets in a form of legal limbo.138 Because the assets were
and administrative proceedings to which the debtor is or was a party within one year
immediately preceding the filing of this bankruptcy case.” Id.
131. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1125.
132. Id. § 1125(a)(1).
133. In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 179, 208 (5th Cir. 1999).
134. See Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 417 (3d Cir.
1988) (“We regard the right-conferring language of Southmark as confirmation of the
debtor’s express obligation of candid disclosure.” (citing Southmark Props. v. Charles House
Corp., 742 F.2d 862, 871 (5th Cir. 1984) (articulating debtor’s right to participate in
reorganization proceedings))).
135. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(7), 1306(a)(1) (defining the bankruptcy estate as including
property interests acquired after the initial petition and filings); Kane v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins.
Co., 535 F.3d 380, 384–85 (5th Cir. 2008) (requiring continuing disclosure in Chapter 7
proceedings); De Leon v. Comcar Indus., 321 F.3d 1289, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2003)
(requiring continuing disclosure in Chapter 13 proceedings); Oneida, 848 F.2d at 417
(requiring continuing disclosure in Chapter 11 proceedings).
136. Section 541 states that:
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates
an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located
and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case.
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); see also id. § 541(a)(7) (“[S]uch estate is comprised of . . . (7) Any
interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the case.”).
137. See Oneida, 848 F.2d at 417.
138. See Brooks v. Beatty, 25 F.3d 1037 (1st Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision), No.
93-1891, 1994 WL 224160, at *3 (May 27, 1994) (“[B]ecause the [debtor’s] action was not
scheduled as an asset, it was never abandoned by the [C]hapter 7 trustee.” (citing 11 U.S.C.
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never distributed by the courts, the assets remain part of the bankruptcy
estate.139 Consequently, where a former bankrupt later seeks to assert an
undisclosed claim in civil litigation, courts will often dismiss the suit for
lack of standing.140 In these instances, only the trustee may bring the claim
on behalf of creditors.141 Dismissal of such claims for lack of standing
where the prior bankruptcy occurred under Chapter 13 is problematic,
however, since under a strict reading of Chapter 13 a debtor acting as the
trustee appears to retain full possession of any estate property not
distributed under the plan.142 Despite the language of the statute, courts
disagree on the exact legal status of claims not disclosed in a Chapter 13
bankruptcy.143 Perhaps to avoid this confusion, bankruptcy courts looking
to ensure final settlement of the bankruptcy case may cite the all-inclusive
nature of the bankruptcy estate under § 541 as evidence of the need for
debtors’ complete disclosure of assets and interests.144
4. Benefits of Bankruptcy
The significant benefits that debtors derive from the bankruptcy process
warrant such intrusive disclosure requirements.
Upon successfully
petitioning a bankruptcy court, a debtor immediately receives the protection
of a stay in all proceedings initiated against him.145 Absent this protection,
debtors’ assets would remain subject to lien or seizure in accordance with
their local states’ collection laws.146 Such laws, often based on the

§ 554(d) and United States v. Grant, 971 F.2d 799, 803 n.4 (1st Cir. 1992) (en banc))). The
Grant court had held that abandonment by trustee “does not relinquish an undisclosed
interest in property.” Grant, 971 F.2d at 803 n.4 (citing Dushane v. Beall, 161 U.S. 513, 516
(1896)).
139. See Brooks, 1994 WL 224160, at *3.
140. See id.
141. See Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003) (permitting
the trustee to pursue a bankrupt debtor’s undisclosed employment discrimination suit under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a), which states that “[e]very action shall be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest.”).
142. See 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (2006) (“Except as provided in a confirmed plan or order
confirming a plan, the debtor shall remain in possession of all property of the estate.”); see
also Barbosa v. Solomon, 235 F.3d 31, 36–37 (1st Cir. 2000). Additionally, a trustee may
decide or be ordered by a court to abandon interests in the estate, thus relinquishing
undisclosed claims to the debtor. See Moses v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 606 F.3d 789, 791
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that Chapter 7 trustee’s abandonment of claims conveyed standing
on a debtor to bring claims post-bankruptcy); Eastman v. Union Pac. R.R., 493 F.3d 1151,
1155 (10th Cir. 2007) (permitting a former debtor to serve as the “real-party-in-interest” in a
suit following a bankruptcy where the bankruptcy court had previously directed the trustee to
abandon any interest in the suit).
143. See Woodard v. Taco Bueno Rests., Inc., No. 4:05-CV-804-Y, 2006 WL 3542693, at
*4–11 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2006) (identifying five different legal standards applied to
determine the property rights of assets following the confirmation of a Chapter 13
bankruptcy plan but prior to completion of the debtor’s payments under the plan).
144. See Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002).
145. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 362. The stay is subject to numerous exceptions, though
these are generally related to criminal, family law, and tax proceedings. Id. § 362(b).
146. MARTIN & TAMA, supra note 92, at 11.
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principle of “first in time is first in right,” create strong incentives for
creditors to engage in aggressive collection practices147 which may border
on, or indeed constitute criminal harassment of, the debtor.148 The
“breathing room” the automatic stay provides is therefore a significant
benefit to bankruptcy petitioners beset by numerous creditors and facilitates
the orderly disposition of all debts through the bankruptcy proceeding.149
In addition to the initial stay, the Bankruptcy Code permits petitioners to
wholly exempt some property from the claims of creditors.150 Section 522
outlines the properties exempt under the federal code and allows for
exemptions under state law.151 These “homestead exemptions” vary across
states and in some cases permit debtors to shield valuable debtor property
from creditors.152 Also beneficial to petitioners, execution of a repayment
plan under either Chapters 11 or 13 often takes place over a protracted
period of time.153 Likewise under either chapter, the plan approved by the
court with creditor input will often reduce the total liabilities owed to
creditors.154
Perhaps most important, at the end of the bankruptcy process under each
chapter, the debtor receives a “fresh start.”155 That is, subject to certain
statutorily defined exceptions,156 discharge from bankruptcy resolves any
debts a debtor possessed prior to their bankruptcy petition.157 Indeed, the
147. Elina Chechelnitsky, Note, D&O Insurance in Bankruptcy: Just Another Business
Contract, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 825, 831 (2009).
148. Congress took note of the ill effects of zealous debt pursuit by creditors in 1977
when it passed the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. See Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874
(1977). Thus, the harm that abusive debt-collection practices inflicts on debtors is now
recognized by the law. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2006).
149. In re Soares, 107 F.3d 969, 977 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Congress intended the stay to
afford debtors breathing room and to assure creditors of equitable distribution.” (citing The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, H.R. REP. 95-595 (1978))).
150. See 11 U.S.C. § 522.
151. Id.
152. Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy: Past Puzzles, Recent Reforms, and the Mortgage
Crisis, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 4 (2009). In states like Texas and Florida, for example,
the homestead exemption laws have no statutory maximum value, thus, a debtor may exempt
a multimillion dollar home from creditors. Id.
153. Section 1143 requires creditors seeking to participate in the plan to present security
interests and claims within five years of confirmation of the plan, suggesting the debtor’s
period of repayment may extend for many years. See 11 U.S.C. § 1143. In the case of
Chapter 13 petitioners, though a debtor must begin making payments to the court appointed
trustee within thirty days of filing, § 1326(a), full payment of claims under the plan may take
as long as five years. See id. § 1322(d)(1)–(2).
154. In fact, under 11 U.S.C. § 1124, all claims addressed in the reorganization plan are
presumed “impaired” (i.e., they modify the value the creditor would otherwise receive from
the debtor), and their repayment under the plan is subject to approval by the court. See id.
§ 1129.
155. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 447 (2004).
156. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (defining nondischargeable debts).
157. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp., 541 U.S. at 447 (“The discharge order releases a
debtor from personal liability with respect to any discharged debt by voiding any past or
future judgments on the debt and by operating as an injunction to prohibit creditors from
attempting to collect or to recover the debt.” (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524)); see also 11 U.S.C.
§§ 727, 1141, 1328 (identifying the specific effects of discharge under each Chapter).
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Supreme Court noted in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,158 that to “relieve the
honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to
start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon
business misfortunes” is central to U.S. bankruptcy law’s aims.159
5. Preventing Abuse
Courts are on guard for abuses of bankruptcy’s protections by debtors.160
Given the various ways in which the bankruptcy process provides debtors
an opportunity to shield themselves from valid claims by creditors, courts
seek to ensure only debtors facing legitimate financial difficulties employ
federal bankruptcy’s protections.161 The Bankruptcy Code itself permits
the court to dismiss a bankruptcy petition in its entirety where permitting
the case to continue would constitute an abuse of the law’s purpose.162
Substantial judicial gloss has effectively turned these procedural powers of
the court into a de facto obligation of goodfaith on the debtor seeking
bankruptcy’s protections.163 Consequently, in the interest of protecting
creditors, during the bankruptcy proceedings, representations and actions
before the court are strictly scrutinized for compliance with the Code’s
provisions.164 Noncompliance may be punished by both adverse rulings in
the bankruptcy proceeding itself or criminal charges of perjury.165
A similar implied interest has been recognized by courts seeking to
promote finality in bankruptcy proceedings.166 Though the Bankruptcy
Code expressly allows for the reopening of bankruptcy cases,167 other
provisions of the Code impose on the court an obligation to ensure that
implementation of the bankruptcy is realistic and unlikely to result in a

158. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
159. Id. at 244–45 (citing Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55
(1915)); see also id. (collecting cases affirming the new opportunity bankruptcy is intended
to provide the honest debtor).
160. See generally In re Am. Prop. Corp., 44 B.R. 180, 182 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984)
(examining bankruptcy’s good-faith requirement).
161. “[D]ebtors seeking protection of the Bankruptcy Court must have real debt, real
creditors, and a legitimate business purpose.” Id.
162. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (permiting dismissal where continuing in bankruptcy
would constitute an abuse); id. § 1112(b)(1) (permitting dismissal “for cause”); id. § 1307(c)
(same).
163. Am. Prop. Corp., 44 B.R. at 182. (“Although Chapter 11 does not by its terms
require that a petition be filed in ‘good faith’ the Courts have implied such a provision to
prevent abuse of the Bankruptcy laws and to protect jurisdictional integrity.”).
164. “[T]he Code makes plain that bankruptcy courts have the authority—indeed, the
obligation—to direct a debtor to conform his plan to the requirements of [the relevant
provisions].” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1381 (2010).
165. See generally 11 U.S.C §§ 110, 727(a)(4)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 152 (2006) (outlining the
criminal penalties for fraudulent bankruptcy filings); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 (authorizing
sanctions against debtors and attorneys for false representations made during a bankruptcy
proceeding).
166. See Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 417 (3d Cir.
1988).
167. See 11 U.S.C. § 350.
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reopening of the case.168 Perhaps it is not surprising then, that various
estoppel doctrines, in particular res judicata’s focus on finality in litigation,
have long served to bar collateral attack on actions by the bankruptcy
court.169 Given its similarity to res judicata, and additional focus on
promoting the integrity of the judicial process, a court’s application of
judicial estoppel post-bankruptcy has come to serve a similar role.
II. FEDERAL UNIFORMITY VS. STATE DISCORD
Given the broadly recognized interests served by the United States’
uniform Bankruptcy Code and the desire of the courts to ensure the
integrity of their processes,170 judicial estoppel has become an increasingly
popular means of dismissing claims brought by former debtors who failed
to disclose those claims as assets in their prior bankruptcy proceedings.
There is now a strong consensus among the federal circuits as to the
standards to be applied in such cases.171 By contrast, state application of
judicial estoppel post-bankruptcy, though at times roughly following federal
law, is subject to varying standards which may lead to divergent results
from those of the federal courts and potentially undermine the bankruptcy
process.172
A. The Circuit Courts’ Evolution Toward a Uniform Practice
The federal application of judicial estoppel post-bankruptcy has steadily
evolved toward a uniform application of the doctrine.173 Just ten years ago,
few would have predicted such an evolution might occur.174 Prior to the
turn of the century, federal courts largely applied their own versions of
judicial estoppel, and one circuit refused to recognize the doctrine
168. See id. §§ 1129(a)(11), 1325(a)(6). In addition, the provisions of the Code covering
discharge of the bankruptcy case are structured on the presumption that a discharge granting
relief from a creditor’s claims will occur. See generally id. §§ 727(a), 1141(d)(1), 1328(a).
169. See generally Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, (1992); Stoll v. Gottlieb,
305 U.S. 165 (1938).
170. “The basic principle of [U.S.] bankruptcy is to obtain a discharge from one’s
creditors in return for all one’s assets, except those exempt, as a result of which creditors
release their own claims and the bankrupt can start fresh.” Payless Wholesale Distribs., Inc.
v. Alberto Culver (P.R.) Inc., 989 F.2d 570, 571 (1st Cir. 1993).
171. See generally Eastman v. Union Pac. R.R., 493 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2007); Barger
v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003); Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761 (6th
Cir. 2002); Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002); In re Coastal
Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 1999).
172. Compare Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 362
(3d Cir. 1996) (“[J]udicial estoppel would be inappropriate in any event as there is no
evidence that Ryan acted in bad faith.”), with Ruffin v. Kinder Morgan Liquids Terminal,
LLC, No. L-8976-04, 2009 WL 17887, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 2, 2009) (“[A]
finding of ‘bad faith’ is not a requirement under New Jersey law.” (quoting City of Atlantic
City v. Cal. Ave. Ventures, LLC, 23 N.J. Tax 62, 68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006)).
173. Compare Brown, Carpenter & Snow, supra note 25, at 222–23 (noting that in 2001,
no consistent federal standard of judicial estoppel existed), with infra note 206 and
accompanying text.
174. Id. at 222.
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altogether.175 Today, while the federal circuits may otherwise diverge in
their general application of judicial estoppel, recognition of the interests
protected by federal bankruptcy has led to largely uniform application of
the doctrine among the nine circuits that have applied the doctrine in the
post-bankruptcy context.176 The result is a strong protection within federal
jurisdictions of the bankruptcy process and its attendant disclosure
requirements, while allowing for flexible application of judicial estoppel in
unusual circumstances.177
1. Evolution of Doctrine
The first federal circuit case considering the doctrine of judicial estoppel
to bar prior bankrupts from pursuing claims undisclosed as assets in their
bankruptcy proceedings was Oneida Motor Freight, Inc., v. United Jersey
Bank.178 In Oneida, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of various
contract claims by the Oneida Freight trucking company, against United
Jersey Bank, due largely to the company’s failure to include the claims as
assets in its prior Chapter 11 bankruptcy.179 Though the decision actually
rested on the doctrine of equitable estoppel,180 the court noted judicial
estoppel as an alternative available theory.181 More important to the
development of the doctrine itself was the court’s focus on the importance
of full disclosure under U.S. bankruptcy law.182
The Oneida decision was the first at the federal circuit level to analyze
and integrate the Bankruptcy Code’s broad disclosure requirements with
judicial estoppel.183 Among other observations, the Oneida court noted that
in the context of a U.S. bankruptcy, a debtor is obligated to schedule all his
interests and property rights.184 The court added that the disclosure
statement is a source of great reliance for both the creditors and the
bankruptcy court.185 Lastly, given the strong interest in achieving finality
175. Id. (citing United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land, 802 F.2d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1986)
(“The Tenth Circuit . . . has rejected the doctrine of judicial estoppel.”)).
176. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
177. See Sea Trade Co. v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 03 Civ. 10254, 2008 WL 4129620,
at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2008) (applying judicial estoppel to bar a suit undisclosed in a
prior bankruptcy proceeding in Argentina), aff’d sub nom. Adrogué Chico S.A. v.
FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 427 F. App’x 43 (2d Cir. 2011).
178. 848 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1988).
179. See id. at 418.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 419.
182. See id. at 416–18.
183. It can be argued that this decision in effect created the modern day obligation for
petitioners in bankruptcy to schedule litigable claims as assets under 11 U.S.C. § 1125’s
broad disclosure requirements. Prior to Oneida, only district and bankruptcy courts had
addressed the issue. See, e.g., Monroe Cnty. Oil Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 75 B.R. 158, 162
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1987) (applying equitable estoppel to bar claims undisclosed in bankruptcy
in subsequent litigation); In re Galerie Des Monnaies of Geneva, Ltd., 55 B.R. 253, 259–60
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
184. See Oneida, 848 F.2d at 416–17.
185. See id. at 417.
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in bankruptcy proceedings,186 the court argued that permitting the suit to
proceed would constitute a “collateral attack” on the bankruptcy court’s
confirmation of the Chapter 11 proceeding.187 In this context, the court
found that Oneida’s failure to disclose the suit, “worked in opposition to
preservation of the integrity of the system which the doctrine of judicial
estoppel seeks to protect.”188 Other circuits soon followed suit,189 but none
explored judicial estoppel in the unique context of post-bankruptcy
litigation nor offered a clear articulation of its requirements at the circuit
level until the Third Circuit addressed the question eight years later in Ryan
Operations v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co.190
In Ryan, the court drew upon the Oneida court’s reasoning when it
declined to apply judicial estoppel against a debtor corporation that had
failed to disclose claims for breach of warranty against a number of
creditors in its bankruptcy petition.191 The Ryan decision rested largely on
the court finding no bad faith conduct by the debtor.192 The court found
that the debtor innocently failed to disclose assets and liabilities, both of
which the debtor sought to correct in amended filings.193 Additionally, at
the time of the attempted modification, the debtor was acting as a debtor-inpossession under Chapter 11, and any recovery under the claim would inure
to the benefit of creditors.194 Thus, the apparently innocent omission of the
claim by the debtor195 and the lack of motive to conceal the claim, given the
creditors’ participation in any recovery, led the court to conclude
application of judicial estoppel was inappropriate under the
circumstances.196 Though the court did not expressly establish a standard
by which good faith mistake may be established to prevent application of
judicial estoppel, the court’s observations would become the backbone of
the good-faith mistake standard later announced by the Fifth Circuit.197
186. See id. (citing Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938), Bohack Corp. v. Iowa Beef
Processors, Inc., 715 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1983)).
187. Id. at 418.
188. Id. at 419.
189. See McGillvary v. City of Troy, 30 F.3d 134 (6th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table
decision); Payless Wholesale Distribs., Inc. v. Alberto Culver, Inc., 989 F.2d 570 (1st Cir.
1993); Hay v. First Interstate Bank of Kalispell, N.A., 978 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1992).
190. 81 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 1996).
191. See id. at 365.
192. See id. at 363–64.
193. Id. at 363 (“Ryan’s failure to list the instant claims as contingent assets was offset by
its failure to list the corresponding claims of homeowners against Ryan resulting from the
allegedly defective wood trim as liabilities.”).
194. Id.
195. See id. at 363.
196. See id. (holding that because creditors would receive or bear the same percentage of
any gains or losses from continued pursuit of Ryan’s claims, Ryan apparently derived and
intended no appreciable benefit from failing to disclose the claims).
197. Compare id. (“[In Oneida, the] combination of knowledge of the claim and motive
for concealment in the face of an affirmative duty to disclose gave rise to an inference of
intent sufficient to satisfy the requirements of judicial estoppel.”), with In re Coastal Plains,
Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 210 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[I]n considering judicial estoppel for bankruptcy
cases, the debtor’s failure to satisfy its statutory disclosure duty is ‘inadvertent’ only when
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In 1999, the Fifth Circuit combined the theories announced in Oneida
and Ryan into a single cohesive theory, articulating a clear standard for
judicial estoppel as applied in the post-bankruptcy context.198 In In re
Coastal Plains, Inc.,199 the court applied judicial estoppel to bar a breach of
contract suit brought by the former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of
Coastal Plains, Inc., a then-defunct Chapter 11 debtor-corporation.200 The
debtor’s CEO had formed a new company and purchased the residual of
Coastal Plains’ estate from a third party.201 Though this later purchase by
the CEO’s new company expressly included the claim, Coastal Plains’
schedule of assets had contained no mention of the claim.202
In effect, the court adopted a three part standard for application of the
doctrine in the context of post-bankruptcy litigation:
“(1) [Judicial estoppel] may be applied only where the position of the
party to be estopped is clearly inconsistent with its previous one”;203 and
“(2) that party must have convinced the court to accept that previous
position”;204 and
(3) the parties’ inconsistency was not inadvertent; the debtor acts
inadvertently if
(a) “the debtor . . . lacks knowledge of the undisclosed claims”; or
(b) “has no motive for their concealment.”205

This standard, as derived from the initial Oneida ruling, including
Coastal Plains’ standard for good-faith mistake, has become the de facto
standard for federal courts applying judicial estoppel to claims previously
undisclosed in bankruptcy brought by former debtors.206

. . . the debtor either lacks knowledge of the undisclosed claims or has no motive for their
concealment.”).
198. See Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d at 206.
199. 179 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 1999).
200. See id. at 203–04.
201. See id. at 203.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 206.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 210.
206. See generally Moses v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 606 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 2010);
Schomaker v. United States, 334 F. App’x 336 (1st Cir. 2009); Eastman v. Union Pac. R.R.,
493 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2007); Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir.
2006); Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314
(3d Cir. 2003); Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761 (6th Cir. 2002); Hamilton v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d
1289 (11th Cir. 2003). The Second Circuit recently endorsed the first two elements of the
standard in In re Adelphia Recovery Trust. See 634 F.3d 678, 695–96 (2d Cir. 2011). Prior
to Adelphia Recovery Trust, the court had endorsed Coastal Plains in unpublished opinions.
See, e.g., Sea Trade Co. v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 03 Civ. 10254, 2008 WL 4129620, at
*17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2008) (citing Coastal Plains favorably and barring a suit undisclosed
in prior bankruptcy proceedings where the debtor knew of a potential claim and had a motive
to conceal it), aff’d sub nom. Adrogué Chico S.A. v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 427 F. App’x
43 (2d Cir. 2011); see also In re I. Appel Corp., 104 F. App’x 199, 201 (2d Cir. 2004)
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Critical to the doctrine’s growing acceptance over the ensuing decade
was the Supreme Court’s reexamination of judicial estoppel in New
Hampshire.207 While not a bankruptcy case, the New Hampshire decision
gave the Supreme Court’s imprimatur to the application of judicial estoppel
and outlined general principles to guide courts applying the doctrine in the
future.208 New Hampshire led the Tenth Circuit to abandon its prior
resistance to the doctrine in Johnson v. Lindon City Corp.209 The Tenth
Circuit later applied the doctrine to a debtor post-bankruptcy in Eastman v.
Union Pacific Railroad210 The Eastman court barred the plaintiff from
pursuing a personal injury claim he mischaracterized as a workmen’s
compensation claim in oral representations during his prior bankruptcy.211
In doing so, the court expressly endorsed the standards for good-faith
mistake announced in Coastal Plains, noting the doctrine’s wide acceptance
among various circuits.212
The New Hampshire ruling also led some courts to incorporate an
additional requirement into their judicial estoppel standards that the litigant
stand to gain an “unfair advantage” by maintaining the two inconsistent
positions.213 In the post-bankruptcy context, however, the effect of this
addition (which appears to be more akin to an equitable estoppel
analysis)214 has largely proven irrelevant given the good-faith mistake
requirements outlined Coastal Plains as derived from Ryan.215 Indeed, as
first discussed in Ryan, a court’s determination that a litigant lacked
“motive to conceal” implies the litigant would gain no unfair advantage as a
result of the inconsistent positions.216
The Eleventh Circuit for some time maintained a somewhat unique
standard of judicial estoppel among the federal circuits.217 While the
standard announced in Coastal Plains, not to mention the New Hampshire
decision itself,218 is effectively an endorsement of the “judicial acceptance”
(distinguishing various circuits in declining to apply judicial estoppel where a debtor’s prior
disclosures sufficiently informed the bankruptcy court of potential claims).
207. See 532 U.S. 742 (2001); see also supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.
208. See Eastman, 493 F.3d at 1156 n.4.
209. 405 F.3d 1065, 1068–69 (10th Cir. 2005).
210. See Eastman, 493 F.3d at 1156.
211. See id. at 1153–55.
212. See id. at 1157–58.
213. See In re Adelphia Recovery Trust, 634 F.3d 678, 696 (2d Cir. 2011); Moses v.
Howard Univ. Hosp., 606 F.3d 789, 798 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing New Hampshire v. Maine,
532 U.S. 742, 750–51 (2001) (requiring courts to answer before applying judicial estoppel,
inter alia: “Will the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position derive an unfair
advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped?”)).
214. See Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 223 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996).
215. 179 F.3d 197, 210 (5th Cir. 1999).
216. See Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 363 (3d
Cir. 1996) (distinguishing Oneida from the instant case where the litigant lacked “motive for
concealment” since he would have gained no advantage through maintenance of the suit).
217. Compare Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003), with
Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 210.
218. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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version of judicial estoppel, until recently, the Eleventh Circuit judicial
estoppel standard was structured as a “sanctity of the oath” standard.219
Prior to New Hampshire, the Eleventh Circuit required that the inconsistent
party’s prior position be both made under oath and calculated to make a
mockery of the judicial system.220 Following New Hampshire, the Eleventh
Circuit began to gradually integrate the more common judicial acceptance
standard,221 eventually applying the doctrine without consideration of the
oath requirement.222 This shift is more subtle than substantive, since in the
context of post-bankruptcy petitions, any divergence between the two
formulations proves largely irrelevant.223
2. Federal Application
Given the requirements imposed by the Bankruptcy Code, failure to
disclose assets or claims of which the debtor has knowledge is always a
violation of the debtor’s “oath.”224 Courts have noted that the discrepancy
between a debtor’s sworn disclosures or representations and a later position
may serve as evidence that the individual’s two positions are “intentionally
inconsistent.”225 Additionally, the level of judicial acceptance required to
justify application of the doctrine is generally fairly low.226 While a court
may not apply judicial estoppel if the prior bankruptcy proceeding was
dismissed immediately upon petition,227 a court’s de minimis acceptance of
the debtor’s asset representations may be sufficient to justify estoppel in a
subsequent suit.228 Thus, most undisclosed suits brought subsequent to a
successful bankruptcy petition will satisfy one standard or the other.
219. See Barger, 348 F.3d at 1293–94 (“The applicability of judicial estoppel largely
turns on two factors. First, a party’s allegedly inconsistent positions must have been made
under oath in a prior proceeding. Second, the inconsistencies must be shown to have been
calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system.” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
220. See Taylor v. Food World, Inc., 133 F.3d 1419, 1422 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Judicial
estoppel ‘is applied to the calculated assertion of divergent sworn positions . . . [and] is
designed to prevent parties from making a mockery of justice by inconsistent pleadings.’”
(quoting McKinnon v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 935 F.2d 1187, 1192 (11th Cir.
1991) (emphasis added))).
221. See Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 2002).
222. See, e.g., Jaffe v. Bank of Am., N.A., 395 F. App’x 583 (11th Cir. 2010); Fetterhoff
v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 282 F. App’x 740 (11th Cir. 2008).
223. See Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1285–86 (finding the Eleventh Circuit standard consistent
with the New Hampshire standard).
224. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
225. See Schomaker v. United States, 334 F. App’x 336, 340 (1st Cir. 2009).
226. See White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., 617 F.3d 472, 478–79 (6th Cir.
2010) (applying judicial estoppel where prior bankruptcy court adopted inconsistent position
as a preliminary matter).
227. See Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1049 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no
judicial acceptance a where former bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed upon a motion by
the trustee reviewing the filing).
228. See White, 617 F.3d at 476 (noting that in the bankruptcy context, judicial estoppel is
applicable “where the prior court adopted the contrary position . . . ‘as a preliminary matter’”
(quoting Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 775–76 (6th Cir. 2002))).
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The ease with which judicial estoppel may be applied should not suggest
that the federal courts are inflexible in their application of the doctrine.229
The federal circuits often note that, as an equitable doctrine, application is
at the discretion of the court,230 and that the standards applied are not to be
enforced mechanistically.231 To that end, the courts often decline to estop a
litigant whose filings may have omitted potential future claims, but whose
other representations to the court provide sufficient notice of potential
future suits.232 Generally, where a debtor did not list a potential claim in
his schedule of assets but disclosed the contemplated suit in his statement of
financial affairs, the court will find such disclosure sufficient to defeat
judicial estoppel.233 The same is true where oral representations made by
the debtor to the trustee or creditors provide notice of future claims.234
Where a debtor reveals potential claims but mischaracterizes them and their
worth, however, the courts may still apply the doctrine of judicial
estoppel.235 Similarly, boilerplate disclaimers hinting at future litigation
but providing no information about the basis or value of any future recovery
are also inadequate.236 In short, courts appear most inclined to apply the
doctrine’s harsh effects only where the debtor’s actions belie a clear intent
to defraud the courts.237
This inclination extends to efforts by the debtor to amend his bankruptcy
filings or reopen previously discharged bankruptcy cases to disclose the
claims.238 Where the debtor’s petition to amend or reopen his bankruptcy
case is only filed in response to an opponent’s efforts to invoke judicial
estoppel in the second suit, the courts are not inclined to believe the
debtor’s initial omission was inadvertent.239
Another circumstance in which the federal standard has proven flexible is
in its accommodation of foreign bankruptcy regimes.240 In Sea Trade Co.
v. FleetBoston Financial Corp.,241 the district court engaged in a thorough
review of Argentine bankruptcy law in applying judicial estoppel to bar a
229. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001) (finding that there is no
clear set of rules for the application of judicial estoppel).
230. Id.
231. See id.; White, 617 F.3d at 476.
232. In re Kane, 628 F.3d 631, 639–40 (3d Cir. 2010); In re I. Appel Corp., 104 F. App’x
199, 201 (2d Cir. 2004).
233. See Kane, 628 F.3d at 640 n.4.
234. See id.
235. Eastman v. Union Pac. R.R., 493 F.3d 1151, 1158–59 (10th Cir. 2007).
236. In re United Operating, LLC, 540 F.3d 351, 355–56 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that a
blanket reservation of “any and all claims” did not provide proper notice to creditors of the
claims’ value).
237. Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Because of the harsh results
attendant with precluding a party from asserting a position that would normally be available
to the party, judicial estoppel must be applied with caution.”).
238. See Higgins v. Potter, 416 F. App’x 731 (10th Cir. 2011).
239. See id. at 732.
240. See Sea Trade Co. v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 03 Civ. 10254, 2008 WL 4129620,
at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2008).
241. No. 03 Civ. 10254, 2008 WL 4129620 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2008).
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real estate development company from pursuing a breach of contract claim
it had not disclosed in its prior Argentine bankruptcy proceedings.242 The
court’s finding, that Argentine bankruptcy law imposed the same disclosure
requirements on debtors as the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, was essential to its
holding.243 Conversely, implicit in the Sea Trade reasoning is the
recognition that where a foreign bankruptcy regime does not impose such
stringent disclosure requirements on bankruptcy petitioners, judicial
estoppel would not be appropriate.244 In such a situation, barring other
evidence, the debtor’s positions would not be inconsistent.245
In effect, the Sea Trade decision illustrates the maturity of the federal
standard of judicial estoppel post-bankruptcy. While the consensus among
the circuits derives from the common recognition of the importance of U.S.
bankruptcy’s integrity,246 the federal courts’ experience with the doctrine
allowed for its nuanced application in the context of foreign law
recognition. Not surprisingly, the Sea Trade court drew from several sistercircuit opinions, including Oneida and Coastal Plains, in reaching its
decision.247 Thus, the once “discrete” doctrine of judicial estoppel, as
broadly employed across the federal courts, has become a powerful and
effective tool with which to guard the integrity of bankruptcy proceedings.
B. The States’ Idiosyncratic Applications of the Doctrine
Unlike the federal courts, where a general consensus has emerged with
respect to judicial estoppel in the post-bankruptcy context, application of
the doctrine in the state courts remains varied. Though the New Hampshire
ruling has effectively resolved the question of the doctrine’s validity,248 a
number of idiosyncratic practices and exceptions to judicial estoppel exist
among the states.249 A few of these practices are wholly rejected by all
federal jurisdictions.250 Other practices are based on imprecise application
of federal precedent and subsequent modification within the state.251
Consequently, the largely uniform federal application of judicial estoppel in
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at *6 (“To decide whether Adrogué Chico’s position in the Argentine bankruptcy
proceeding was inconsistent with its present claim, the Court must look to the applicable
provisions of the [Argentine Bankruptcy Law (ABL)]. The Court must determine whether,
under the ABL, Adrogué Chico was required to make the disclosures identified by the Bank
and, if the disclosures were in fact required, whether their omission in the Argentine
proceeding is fundamentally inconsistent with Adrogué Chico’s pursuit of its claim in this
Court.”).
245. Id. at *6–7.
246. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
247. See Sea Trade, 2008 WL 4129620, at *12.
248. Prince Constr. Co., v. D.C. Contract Appeals Bd., 892 A.2d 380, 386 n.7 (D.C.
2006) (describing the District of Columbia’s gradual acceptance of the doctrine and the New
Hampshire decision’s role in that process).
249. See infra notes 252–86 and accompanying text.
250. See infra note 283 and accompanying text.
251. See infra notes 282–86 and accompanying text.
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the post-bankruptcy practice is at times undermined by states’ novel
interpretations of this discrete doctrine.
1. State Practices
New York courts’ experiences with judicial estoppel are illustrative of
common divergences made by states. In some instances, courts appear to
be simply unfamiliar with the doctrine of judicial estoppel and bankruptcy’s
disclosure requirements.252 For example, in Rodriguez v. Koval, Rejtig &
Dean, PLLC,253 a New York trial court justice denied summary judgment to
the defendant law firm, which was accused of failing to commence a
personal injury action on behalf of the plaintiff.254 The firm asserted as a
defense that its decision not to file the action stemmed from the plaintiff’s
failure to include his personal injury action in his prior bankruptcy, which
had been fully discharged.255 The court, though noting the preclusive
effects of judicial estoppel,256 declined to apply the doctrine.257 Instead, the
court found, contrary to established federal bankruptcy practice, that
because the claim had not been commenced, the plaintiff was under no duty
to include the claim in his schedule of assets.258
The Rodriguez opinion also highlighted another common misconception
in the state courts: the conflation of the doctrine of judicial estoppel and
post-bankruptcy standing.259 Indeed, the practice of barring claims brought
by debtors post-bankruptcy for lack of standing260 has often colored
application of judicial estoppel.261 Given their interrelatedness, the two
252. See Rodriguez v. Koval, Rejtig & Dean, PLLC, 889 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sup. Ct. 2009)
(unpublished table decision), 2009 WL 1587186, at *2 (May 13, 2009). See generally
Bunnell v. Lewis, No. 05-92-02558-CV, 1993 WL 290781 (Tex. App. July 27, 1993)
(finding debtor not required to disclose future suit for value of partnership interest).
253. 889 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (unpublished table decision), 2009 WL 1587186
(May 13, 2009).
254. See id. at *2.
255. Id. at *1.
256. Id.
257. Id. at *2 (“Here, the defendants have not demonstrated, as a matter of law, that the
plaintiff, in failing to list the personal injury action as an asset in his bankruptcy proceeding
has taken an ‘inconsistent’ position, or is playing fast and loose with the court and therefore,
is precluded from pursuing the instant action for legal malpractice.”).
258. Compare id. (“[I]t is axiomatic that plaintiff did not list the personal injury action as
an asset in his bankruptcy proceeding as the action was not commenced.”), with supra notes
128–29 and accompanying text.
259. The Rodriguez court relied upon Pinto v. Ancona, 692 N.Y.S.2d 128 (App. Div.
1999), to suggest that by reopening his bankruptcy case, the plaintiff may be permitted to
avoid application of judicial estoppel. See Rodriguez, 2009 WL 1587186, at *2. The Ancona
decision, however, does not address the question of judicial estoppel at all and is instead a
ruling on debtor standing. See Ancona, 692 N.Y.S.2d 128.
260. See supra notes 138–43 and accompanying text.
261. Compare Kenney v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 8 A.D.3d 989, 989 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2004) (denying application of judicial estoppel to an undisclosed personal injury action
because a Chapter 13 debtor retains standing to bring suit), with Robinson v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., 595 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying judicial estoppel to a Chapter 13
debtor).
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questions are often addressed simultaneously.262 Federal courts, however,
have routinely rejected the premise that a former debtor’s standing to bring
a claim is a bar to applicability of judicial estoppel.263
Similarly, federal courts refuse to impute any curative effect to a debtor’s
efforts to reopen a bankruptcy case.264 Some, but not all, state courts have
also adopted this position.265 In New York, however, the curative effect of
reopening a bankruptcy case developed out of a line of cases demonstrating
a common error in state court application of judicial estoppel postbankruptcy.266 In Koch v. National Basketball Ass’n,267 the court denied
summary judgment to defendants seeking to estop plaintiff from pursuing a
suit for photographic slides not disclosed in the plaintiff’s prior
bankruptcy.268 The court held that, because the reopening of the
bankruptcy estate restored the debtor’s rights under the Code, the reopening
of the case had the effect of nullifying any “final determination . . .
endorsing the party’s inconsistent position” upon which judicial estoppel
could be based.269 While federal law makes no exception to the judicial
estoppel of a debtor where he reopens a case,270 the reopening of a
bankruptcy case continues to nullify the application of judicial estoppel
under New York state law.271
Like the curative effects of reopening, New York’s requirement of a
“final determination” is also at odds with both the predominant federal and
other states’ standards of acceptance.272 The standard as applied in New

262. See B.N. Realty Assocs. v. Lichtenstein, 801 N.Y.S.2d 271 (App. Div. 2005); Best v.
Metlife Auto & Home Ins. Co., 793 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
263. See Moses v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 606 F.3d 789, 791 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
264. See In re Superior Crewboats, Inc., 374 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 2004); Burnes v.
Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002). But see Kane v. Nat’l Union
Fire Ins. Co., 535 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 2008) (permitting a trustee to pursue claims on
behalf of the bankruptcy estate although the debtor might indirectly benefit).
265. See, e.g., Skinner v. Holgate, 173 P.3d 300 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
266. See infra notes 273–86 and accompanying text.
267. 666 N.Y.S.2d 630 (App. Div. 1997).
268. See id. at 630.
269. See id.
270. Federal courts will allow a claim to be pursued by a bankruptcy trustee on behalf of
creditors, but the debtor will otherwise be judicially estopped from pursuing the claim. See,
e.g., Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571 (5th Cir. 2011); Eastman v. Union Pac. R.R.,
493 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2007); Biesek v. Soo Line R.R., 440 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 2006);
Parker v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2004).
271. See also In re Miller, 767 N.Y.S.2d 729, 729 (App. Div. 2003) (citing Koch
favorably).
272. See White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., 617 F.3d 472, 479 (6th Cir. 2010)
(“[W]hen a bankruptcy court—which must protect the interests of all creditors—approves a
payment from the bankruptcy estate on the basis of a party’s assertion of a given position,
that, in our view, is sufficient judicial acceptance to estop the party from later advancing an
inconsistent position.” (citations omitted)); Gottlieb v. Kest, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 7, 19 (Dist. Ct.
App. 2006) (“In California, courts consider . . . whether [inter alia] . . . ‘(1) the same party
has taken two positions . . . (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e.,
the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); . . . .’” (citation omitted)).
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York is derived in part from both state and federal law.273 The federal case
upon which the standard is based, Bates v. Long Island Railroad,274
established that judicial endorsement of a settlement by the parties in a prior
litigation does not demonstrate sufficient judicial acceptance to support the
application of judicial estoppel.275 While New York courts have fashioned
their “final determination” standard from that ruling, the Bates court has
since supported application of judicial estoppel in circumstances involving
less than a complete discharge of the bankruptcy estate.276
New York’s idiosyncratic application of judicial estoppel typifies the
legal divergence that emerges as state court jurisprudence, though perhaps
founded in part on federal law, departs steadily from current federal
practice, though there are other examples.277 In City of Atlantic City v.
California Avenue Ventures, LLC,278 the New Jersey Superior Court
Appellate Division upheld a New Jersey tax court’s application of judicial
estoppel to bar Atlantic City from appealing the tax-assessment value of six
parking lots.279 The court in Atlantic City cited Alternative Systems
Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc.280 as persuasive authority, claiming that in
Alternative System Concepts, the First Circuit did not require a showing of
bad faith to apply judicial estoppel.281 This standard was later applied in
the post-bankruptcy context in Ruffin v. Kinder Morgan Liquids Terminal,
LLC,282 which cited Atlantic City for the proposition that “[a] finding of
‘bad faith’ is not a requirement under New Jersey law.”283 Ironically, the
court in Alternative System Concepts, upon which Atlantic City and by
extension Ruffin relied, in effect required a showing of bad faith when it
noted the general inapplicability of judicial estoppel in circumstances of
good-faith mistake,284 but held that the plaintiff “[could not] colorably lay
claim to the exception.”285 Thus, a federal ruling was imputed to justify a

273. The Koch “final determination” standard was derived from Manhattan Avenue
Development Corp. v. Meit, 637 N.Y.S.2d 134 (App. Div. 1996), in which the court cited
both federal and state precedent for the proposition that a settlement does not constitute a
“judicial endorsement”“ of a party’s claims nor therefore success necessary to apply judicial
estoppel. See id. at 134 (citing Bates v. Long Island R.R., 997 F.2d 1028, 1038 (2d Cir.
1993)), and Chem. Bank v. Aetna Ins. Co., 417 N.Y.S.2d 382, 382 (Sup. Ct. 1979)).
274. 997 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1993).
275. See id. at 1038.
276. See In re Adelphia Recovery Trust, 634 F.3d 678, 697 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that a
court ordered sale of property was sufficient acceptance to apply judicial estoppel).
277. See infra notes 278–86 and accompanying text.
278. 23 N.J. Tax 62 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006).
279. Id. at 69.
280. 374 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2004).
281. See Atlantic City, 23 N.J. Tax at 67–68.
282. No. L-8976-04, 2009 WL 17887 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 2, 2009).
283. Id. at *7.
284. Alt. Sys. Concepts, Inc., 374 F.3d at 35 (“[The] exception may be available if the
responsible party shows that the new, inconsistent position is the product of information
neither known nor readily available to it at the time the initial position was taken.”).
285. Id.
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state legal standard at odds with every federal jurisdiction,286 not to mention
the federal case upon which the legal reasoning relied.287
2. Lex Fori
The frequently cited justification for states’ continued application of their
own judicial estoppel standards is that the purpose of the doctrine is to
protect the integrity of the tribunal in which the inconsistent position
arises.288 This rule of lex fori,289 or the “law of the tribunal,”290 in the
application of judicial estoppel is another area where state practices vary.291
Courts applying the lex fori standard, argue that judicial estoppel is
intended to guard against inconsistent positions, and the forum in which the
inconsistency arises is best suited to address the issue.292 As a general rule,
this application of state standards in applying judicial estoppel conforms to
the prevailing practice in federal courts.293 In the unique context of postbankruptcy litigation, however, the lex fori standard, besides leading to the
divergent practices noted above,294 fails to acknowledge the significant
federal interests inherent in bankruptcy that merit application of federal
judicial estoppel standards to former bankruptcy petitioners.
III. STOLL AND SEMTEK: INSIGHT FOR THE STATES
What preclusive effect will be given to prior federal bankruptcy
proceedings in state courts is not a novel question.295 The Supreme Court
examined the importance of state recognition of federal bankruptcy
proceedings more than seventy years ago.296 Similarly, the Court has
opined on when states may be obligated to recognize the cooptation of their

286. Compare Ruffin, 2009 WL 17887, at *7, and Atlantic City, 23 N.J. Tax at 68–69,
with supra note 206 and accompanying text.
287. Compare Alt. Sys. Concepts, Inc., 374 F.3d at 35, with Ruffin, 2009 WL 17887, at
*7, and Atlantic City, 23 N.J. Tax at 68–69.
288. State, Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, Div. of Gaming Enforcement v. Gonzalez, 641
A.2d 1060, 1070–71 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
289. Middleton v. Caterpillar Indus., Inc., 979 So.2d 53, 60 (Ala. 2007).
290. Anderson & Holober, supra note 39, at 613.
291. Compare Heartland Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Trust Co. of Tex. N.A., 316 S.W.3d 1
(Tex. App. 2010) (applying the rule of judicial estoppel applicable in the jurisdiction of the
prior proceeding), with Gonzalez, 641 A.2d at 1070–71 (applying the lex fori standard).
292. See Gonzalez, 641 A.2d at 1070–71.
293. Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 603–04 (9th Cir. 1996);
Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 n.4 (6th Cir. 1982); Allen v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1167 n.4 (4th Cir. 1982); Rand G. Boyers, Precluding Inconsistent
Statements: The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1244, 1269 (1986)
(noting that the “current tide” in federal jurisprudence was flowing toward application of
federal rules in diversity cases).
294. See supra notes 273–86 and accompanying text.
295. See generally Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938) (requiring states to recognize
the res judicata effects of a bankruptcy confirmation order).
296. Id.
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own rules of preclusion in giving effect to federal judgments.297
Consequently, in the unique context of post-bankruptcy litigation, there is
strong precedent requiring states to adopt and apply the standards of judicial
estoppel common in federal courts.
A. Stoll v. Gottlieb: The Effect of Bankruptcy Proceedings
The clearest articulation of the preclusive effect states must give federal
bankruptcy adjudications was made in Stoll v. Gottlieb.298 In Stoll, the
Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Illinois, holding that a
federal bankruptcy court’s confirmation of a debtor’s reorganization plan
and extinguishment of various guarantees constituted a judgment that could
not later be challenged by the former holder of the guarantees in state
court.299 Though the principal inquiry in Stoll was whether the bankruptcy
court’s determination of jurisdiction over the parties must be given res
judicata effect by the state court,300 the court acknowledged that, “where
the judgment or decree of the federal court determines a right under a
federal statute . . . res judicata is to be given the federal order.”301
Stoll thus highlights an important consideration that should guide states
in applying judicial estoppel post-bankruptcy. Stoll makes clear that the
preclusive effects of federal bankruptcy proceedings are not dependent
upon a final discharge of the debtor from bankruptcy. In Stoll itself,
preclusive effect was afforded the bankruptcy court’s confirmation of a
reorganization plan.302 The language in Stoll, moreover, suggested that any
order issued by the bankruptcy court which addressed the rights of the
parties in bankruptcy was entitled to preclusive effect.303 Thus, while not
specifically addressing application of judicial estoppel, Stoll implied that
the preclusive effects of federal bankruptcy proceedings bind the states.304
This includes the effects of orders or decrees amounting to less than full
adjudications.305
B. Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.:
The Choice of Law
Which jurisidiction’s rule of preclusion should apply in recognizing the
effect of the bankruptcy proceedings? Here, Semtek International Inc. v.
297. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001) (holding that,
where an interest in the integrity of the federal judiciary is at stake, states may need to defer
to the federal rule of preclusion).
298. 305 U.S. 165 (1938).
299. See id. at 177.
300. See id. at 171–72.
301. See id. at 170–71 (emphasis omitted).
302. Id. at 171–72.
303. Id.
304. Id. (applying res judicata to preclude a state claim due to a prior federal bankruptcy
court’s plan confirmation).
305. Id. (affording preclusive effect to a bankruptcy plan confirmation prior to full a
discharge of the bankruptcy).
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Lockheed Martin Corp.306 is instructive. In Semtek, the Court addressed the
issue of states’ recognition of prior federal judgments where the prior
federal court was sitting in diversity.307 The court held that, where state
law claims were adjudicated in federal court, subsequent court proceedings
must apply the rules of preclusion required by federal common law.308
Under federal common law, the court would apply the laws of the state in
which the federal court sat.309 Semtek premised this holding on the lack of
a need for a uniform national rule because state, rather than federal,
substantive law was at issue310 and on the desire to discourage forum
shopping between state and federal courts.311 The court noted, however,
that reference to state law would be inappropriate in some circumstances.312
In particular, the Semtek court suggested that a federal rule should apply
where state laws were incompatible with a federal interest—for example,
when “federal courts’ interest in the integrity of their own processes might
justify a . . . federal rule.”313
The logic in both Stoll and Semtek thus support nationwide application of
the federal rule of judicial estoppel in the post-bankruptcy context. Because
debtors’ disclosure requirements in federal bankruptcy proceedings are
defined by federal law, it is arguable that a bankruptcy court’s acceptance
of those disclosures and any attendant legal implications constitute federal
questions.314 Under Stoll and Semtek, courts must afford these decisions
preclusive effect315 as defined by federal law, in this case the federal rules
of judicial estoppel, which the states must follow.316
Alternatively, where a debtor’s nondisclosed causes of action arise under
state law, affirmation of the existence or absence of such claims’ could be
characterized as a question of state law.317 Under Semtek, a state’s
subsequent evaluation of a federal bankruptcy court order acknowledging
the existence or lack of a state law claim would normally involve a
reference to federal common law under which the court would apply the
law of the state in which the federal court sat.318 As Semtek noted,
however, such reference to state law would not be warranted in
circumstances where a widely recognized safeguard of federal courts’
306. 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
307. See id.
308. See id. at 507–08 (citing Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. 130 (1874)).
309. See id.
310. See id. at 508.
311. See id.
312. See id. at 509.
313. Id.
314. See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (2006); see also In re Cool Fuel, Inc., 210 F.3d 999, 1006 (9th
Cir. 2000) (“Even when a cause of action is based on state law, ‘the question of when a
[claim] arises under the bankruptcy code is governed by federal law.’” (citations omitted));
see also Gottlieb v. Kest, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 7, 21 (Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
315. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171–72 (1938).
316. See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507–08.
317. Accord Kest, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 21–22.
318. See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507–08.

2012]

BANKRUPT ESTOPPEL

1387

integrity is implicated.319 Given that judicial estoppel has become one of
the principal means of protecting the integrity of the bankruptcy process,320
federal judicial estoppel would again appear to be the appropriate standard
for subsequent state courts to apply.
The court’s reasoning in Semtek also makes a strong case for uniform
rules of preclusion following bankruptcy. Semtek sought to prevent federal
versus state court forum shopping and inequitable administration of laws by
subjecting litigants to the same preclusive standards whether or not suit was
brought in federal or state court.321 There is no risk of federal versus state
court forum shopping in bankruptcy, however, since all bankruptcy courts
are federal.322 Because of state divergence in the practice of judicial
estoppel, however, clever bankrupts could still engage in a kind of forum
shopping by bringing a post-bankruptcy suit for undisclosed claims in states
more reluctant to apply judicial estoppel.323 In effect, litigants could
undermine the integrity of the bankruptcy process by forum shopping,
engaging in exactly the fast and loose behavior that judicial estoppel and
Semtek seek to avoid.324 Conversely, states enforcing judicial estoppel
more harshly than federal courts would penalize debtors whose bankruptcy
petitions were made in reliance on federal standards.325 In short, only
through application of a uniform federal rule of judicial estoppel will the
U.S. bankruptcy regime retain the balance of integrity and flexibility federal
courts have sought to preserve.
IV. ADOPTING THE FEDERAL MODEL
There is a practical and legal need for a nationwide standard for judicial
estoppel post-bankruptcy. Though considered a “discrete doctrine” eleven
years ago,326 judicial estoppel is now widely recognized throughout the
federal judiciary and the states. At the same time, the U.S. courts are beset
with growing numbers of personal and commercial bankruptcy filings.327
Following the 2008 financial crisis, U.S. courts saw an average of 1.492
million filings between 2009 and 2011, a 10 percent increase over the

319. Id. at 508–09.
320. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
321. See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508–09.
322. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2006) (conferring original jurisdiction for bankruptcy
proceedings on the district courts).
323. For example, debtors in New York may participate in the recovery of valuable
claims so long as their trustee is willing to reopen the bankruptcy case on behalf of their
creditors. See supra notes 267–69 and accompanying text.
324. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508.
325. For example, defendants in New Jersey appear to have absolute immunity from suits
inadvertently omitted in a plaintiff’s prior bankruptcy. See supra notes 282–83 and
accompanying text.
326. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001).
327. Annual Business and Non-business Filings by Year (1980–2011), AM. BANKR. INST.,
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/Conten
tDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=63164 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
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previous decade’s annual average (1.353 million).328 Given this economic
climate, both state and federal courts will likely grapple with the effects of
prior bankruptcy proceedings on subsequent litigation for some time, and
judicial estoppel will undoubtedly play a significant role. To best ensure
the integrity of the bankruptcy process, however, the application of the
doctrine must be uniform.
This need for a nationally uniform body of laws addressing the legal
impacts of debtor insolvency existed even in the United States’ infancy as a
nation.329 Congress’s enactment of one authoritative Bankruptcy Code to
which states’ laws must yield is a reflection of that need.330 Given the
Code’s structure and conceptual scheme—the requirement of full disclosure
of assets,331 the debtor’s obligation of truthfulness,332 and the allencompassing nature of the bankruptcy estate333—the system adopted lends
itself to protection through application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel.
While some states have recognized this important feature,334 others
perpetuate idiosyncratic applications of the doctrine that serve to
undermine, rather than reinforce, the federal bankruptcy regime.335
Unfortunately, the current jurisprudence surrounding the doctrine is illsuited to achieve the uniformity bankruptcy requires. Courts, both federal
and state, focused on protecting the integrity of their own forum, have
perpetuated the lex fori standard in their choice of law decisions involving
judicial estoppel.336 The divergent practices seen in the states337 are thus
not surprising. This variance may be warranted in the application of
judicial estoppel outside of the post-bankruptcy context. The growing
consensus among federal courts applying judicial estoppel where
bankruptcy’s unique features are implicated,338 however, suggests that
states should recognize the doctrine’s special role in backstopping the
decisions of federal bankruptcy courts.
The impact of bankruptcy court decisions, moreover, given their scope339
and their cooptation of state property law,340 represents an application of
federal power sui generis.
The Supreme Court’s recognition of
bankruptcy’s special character in Stoll, laid the groundwork for a federal
rule of preclusion post-bankruptcy based on judicial estoppel. Stoll
mandated that states recognize the authoritative effect of bankruptcy court

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (2006); see also supra notes 123–29.
See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text.
See Conrad v. Bank of Am., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336, 346–47 (Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
See generally supra Part II.B.
See supra notes 288–93 and accompanying text.
See generally supra Part II.B.
See generally supra Part II.A.
See supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 92–99 and accompanying text.
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orders and decisions even before full discharge of the bankruptcy estate.341
The ruling implies that, in bankruptcy, it is the process of administrating the
estate and the attendant judicial decisions shaping that administration that
are the adjudicative elements to which future courts must yield, not simply
the final discharge of the case. Judicial estoppel, with its requirement of
judicial acceptance, preserves the integrity of that process by binding
debtors to the representations made in seeking bankruptcy’s protections.
As it has come to be applied by the federal courts, judicial estoppel plays
an integral role in courts’ defense of the bankruptcy process distinct from
judicial estoppel’s traditional role.342 Given the extensive asset disclosure
obligations in federal bankruptcy,343 a debtor’s failure to report the
existence of known potential claims in which he retains a property interest
is inherently inconsistent with the future prosecution of those claims. By
removing any incentive for the debtor to conceal these claims, judicial
estoppel ensures the bankruptcy court and the debtor’s creditors are
informed of potentially valuable assets critical to the liquidation or
reorganization of the estate. Thus, unlike traditional applications of judicial
estoppel, in the post-bankruptcy context, the doctrine’s protective effects
preserve both the integrity of the prior bankruptcy proceeding and any
future litigation. This relationship between judicial estoppel and federal
bankruptcy constitutes a unique federal application of the doctrine that
should be afforded appropriate recognition by the states under Semtek.344
Other substantial reasons exist for the states to apply federal standards in
the post-bankruptcy context as well. For one, federal application of the
doctrine in the post-bankruptcy context is now well-developed.345 All of
the federal circuits now have case law addressing the problem of a debtor’s
nondisclosure in a prior bankruptcy.346 Federal courts have also examined
how a prior bankruptcy's Chapter may affect application of the doctrine and
have applied the doctrine against former debtors following Chapter 7, 11,
and 13 bankruptcies.347 Furthermore, the federal courts have addressed the
question of judicial estoppel against former debtors at various stages of the
bankruptcy process including pre- and post-liquidation and pre- and postconfirmation of reorganization plans as well as post-discharge. The courts
have also addressed the application of the doctrine where the debtor has
sought to reopen his bankruptcy proceedings and what effect, if any,
reopening will have on application of judicial estoppel.348

341. See supra notes 298–305 and accompanying text.
342. Cf. Brown, Carpenter & Snow, supra note 25, at 217–18 (suggesting that the
application of the relatively novel doctrine of judicial estoppel may impair the function of
bankruptcy courts in the future).
343. See supra notes 123–29 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 313–24 and accompanying text.
345. See generally supra Part II.A.
346. See generally supra Part II.A.
347. See generally supra Part II.A.
348. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
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Federal courts’ application of the doctrine developed to encompass
exceptions to the doctrine. The federal circuits are nearly unanimous in
their adoption of a standard for good-faith mistake, or inadvertence focused
on the debtor’s knowledge of, and motive for, concealment of undisclosed
claims.349 The Coastal Plains standard, along with the courts’ flexible
standard of adequate disclosure,350 strikes an appropriate balance in
safeguarding bankruptcy’s disclosure requirements while ensuring that only
truly duplicitous conduct by debtors is punished. Furthermore, federal
courts’ limitation of the doctrine’s application to debtors themselves351
ensures that the doctrine does not serve to punish trustees seeking to resolve
the claims for the benefit of the debtors’ creditors and exemplifies the
doctrine’s flexibility.
The federal courts have also demonstrated the ability to adopt the
doctrine to encompass new scenarios likely to arise in the future—in
particular the question of foreign bankruptcies’ effects.352 Congress,
recognizing the growing need for standards addressing cross-border
bankruptcy proceedings, passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005,353 creating the Chapter 15 foreign
bankruptcy recognition provisions.354 At the same time, foreign nations
looking to reform and modernize their commercial insolvency laws,
increasingly adopt the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, in particular Chapter 11.355
Federal courts have begun to grapple with the complex questions that
recognition of foreign bankruptcy proceedings present.356 The ability to
adapt the well-established principals of judicial estoppel in these novel
situations is a testament to the federal standard’s utility and an example
upon which future courts may develop the doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Given the important interests at stake, further development of judicial
estoppel in the post-bankruptcy context should not begin from a disjointed
hodge-podge of jurisprudence. The importance of the federal bankruptcy
regime, which must include the courts that give effect to the bankruptcy
court’s actions, is too great. Federal courts over the past few decades
shaped the application of post-bankruptcy judicial estoppel into a flexible
349. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 232–37 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
352. See Sea Trade Co. v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 03 Civ. 10254, 2008 WL 4129620,
at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Adrogué Chico S.A. v. FleetBoston Fin.
Corp., 427 F. App’x 43 (2d Cir. 2011).
353. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
354. See id.
355. See Mohamed Faizal Mohamed Abdul Kadir, Doing Away with the Emperor’s New
Clothes: Dispelling the Myth of the Good Faith Filing Requirement Under Chapter 11 & Its
International Implications, 19 J. BANKR. L. PRAC. 513, 513 n.6 (2010) (citing Pauline Gan,
Insolvency Law in Asia: Recent Developments, 22 ASIA BUS. L. REV. 12, 19 (1998)).
356. See Sea Trade, 2008 WL 4129620.
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tool to preserve the integrity of the bankruptcy system. These courts
created a doctrine capable of accommodating each of a wide variety of
cases reflecting the need to accommodate the many issues that arise out of
the resolution of debtor insolvency in bankruptcy courts. State courts must
defer to the standard developed by the federal judiciary and must continue
to follow apace with any evolution in the federal standard. It is not a
choice, but an obligation stemming from the preclusive effects of
bankruptcy proceedings, the number of which are growing at an alarming
pace. This “bankrupt estoppel” is essential to the states, therefore, to not
only preserve the integrity of their own courts but to preserve the federal
bankruptcy regime as well.

